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Buchanan: Appropriation of Personality

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF
NAME AND LIKENESS RIGHTS
IN THE UNITED STATES AND
ENGLAND
CATHERINE LOUISE BUCHANAN*

The term right of publicity may appear, at first glance, to be
relatively straightforward. However, the struggle of contemporary English and American law to define this term and to apply
the rights which stem from it belie such straightforwardness. In
the most general language, the right of publicity is the ability of
an individual to "own, protect and commercially exploit his own
name, likeness and identity.!!l The derogation, for monetary gain
of this right, is accomplished by "the use without consent of the
name, likeness or voice of another"2 and when completed is
known in American jurisprudence as the appropriation of
personality.3

This form of appropriation is concerned exclusively with the
unauthorized taking of an identifiable characteristic of a person,
such that its use would be recognized by members of the public."
This comment will not be concerned with other areas that border on this topic, such as defamation, copyright, trademark infringement or unfair competition. Appropriation will be discussed exclusively in relation to the individual characteristics of
• Rights Manager, Granada Television, England; B.A., Sarah Lawrence College,
Bronxville, New York, 1982; J.D., Pepperdine University School of Law, 1986; LL.M.,
London School of Economics, 1987.
1. Rader, The Right of Publicity - A New Dimension, 61 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'y 228
(1979).
2. Frazer, Appropriation of Personality - A New Tort? 99 L.Q. REV. 281 (1983).
3. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
4. [d. at 309.
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private individuals and celebrities whose names and likenesses
comprise a commercial identity.
This comment will initially examine English law regarding
appropriation, using as a point of departure the early professional cases. It will then discuss the contemporary standard applied in modern actions under the theory of passing off, tracing
the development of the theory. Thirdly, the right of privacy will
be examined from the American perspective. The right of publicity, the fourth topic, is derived from the right of privacy. Finally, after a brief look at the extrajudicial source of the rules
utilized by the British Advertising Industry, the comment will
conclude with a discussion of the author's proposals for future
legislation.
I. EARL Y ENGLISH "PROFESSIONAL CASES"

The need to control the use of one's own name for commercial purposes was brought before the courts as far back as the
year 1847 in the case of Routh v. Webster.1! Routh involved the
request for an injunction to prevent the defendant from using
the plaintiff's name, which had been incorrectly listed as a trustee in a prospectus issued by the defendant. The decision granting the injunction provided the initial recognition that such unauthorized use of an individual's name was fundamentally
unjust. The force of the language used by Lord Langdale in rendering his opinion gave cause for optimism to other plaintiffs
similarly situated: "What! Are they to be allowed to use the
name of any person they please, representing him as responsible
in their speculations, and to involve him in all sorts of liabilities ... [c]ertainly not!"6 The use of an injunction was an effective means by which to protect against defendant Webster's appropriation, but in this case relief was predicated upon a theory
of defamation, since the court feared that to hold otherwise
would expose the plaintiff to liability.7 However, in the years to
come, judicial relief in this or any other form was not as readily
provided.
5. 50 Eng. Rep. 698 (M.R. 1847).
6. [d.
7. [d.
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The following year produced the case of Clark v. Freeman. 8
Lord Langdale was again requested to grant an injunction to the
plaintiff, in this instance a prominent physician, to prevent the
defendant from using his name in an advertisement for a fraudulent medicine. The use of the doctor's name was characterized
not as a misappropriation, but rather as a potential libeP Lord
Langdale was therefore not concerned with the issue arising out
of a claim to protect against unauthorized use, but was instead
requested to prevent the plaintiff from being defamed. 10 Although it might appear that the liability which may arise in conjunction with a harmful product might equal that of a business
misrepresentation, the injunction was denied. l l
Lord Langdale gave as his reason for the abrupt change of
position the court's inability to "stay the publication of a libel. "12 However, his reasoning may more accurately be reflected
by his comment: "I do not go along with the notion, that this
physician, eminent as he is, and an honor to any country, has
been seriously injured in his reputation by any such false statements as have been published by the defendant. illS Although
Langdale described the conduct of the defendant in using the
doctor's name without his consent as "disgraceful,"14 by denying
relief he set the stage upon which well-known professionals and
celebrities would struggle, mostly without success, to control the
use of their names.
The absence of legal protection continued although criticized, for example, by the Earl of Selborne in the case of In re
Riviere's Trademark. 1 r. There, the Clark case was mentioned as
establishing the proposition that unless a business interest is injured, there is no cause of action to sustain an application for
injunction. The Earl of Selborne remarked on the artificial distinction between the harm to a business as opposed to a professional interest, stating: "Could not a professional man be injured
in his profession by having his name associated with a quack
8. 50 Eng. Rep 759 (M.R. 1848).
9.Id.
10. Id. at 761.
11. Id. at 762.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 761-62.
14. Id. at 762.
15. 26 Ch.D. 48 (C.A. 1884).
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medicine?"16 Unfortunately for professional plaintiffs, damage in
the form of loss of respect by contemporaries is not as easily
quantifiable as the loss of income or profit to a business.
The effect of Clark u. Freeman was felt stongly in the professional cases which followed in its wake. Of striking significance is the case of Williams u. Hodge & CO.17 In that case, the
plaintiff was a well respected surgeon whose name was used in
conjunction with a catalog advertisement for a standard surgical
instrument. Is The basis of the plaintiff's complaint was that the
advertisement would damage his reputation in the eyes of the
medical profession, as the instrument offered in the catalogue
was of a simple nature. 19 Justice Kay, in delivering his opinion,
conceded that "[t]he defendants had no more right to use the
name of this eminent medical man than to take his purse. "20
In professing a characteristic omniscience assumed by Victorian judges, Justice Kay was compelled to add that he "could
not conceive that anyone in the world would suppose this Gentleman's professional name would be in the least damaged by
this most unscrupulous use of it."21 Here, the judge seems to use
the same reasoning that Lord Langdale applied in Clark, by focusing on what each perceived to be a lack of monetary injury to
a plaintiff physician. In both cases, withholding judicial protection was justified in spite of the ridicule to which the plaintiffs
were exposed. Due to the defamatory nature of the defendant's
act, the judgment indicates that the use of the surgeon's name as
an independent wrong was never considered by Justice Kay. The
professional cases, as discussed later, appear to present a significant obstacle to celebrities seeking to vindicate their own rights
in appropriation cases.
The first demand for legal recognition of a property right in
a name was raised in the case of Du Boulay u. Du Boulay.22 The
case concerned the appellant's request that the respondent be
16. [d. at 53.
17.4 T.L.R. 175 (1887).

18. [d.
19. [d.

20. [d.
21. [d.
22. 2 L.R.-P.C. 430 (1869).
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permanently enjoined from assuming as his own the surname of
Du Boulay.23 The respondent's mother had formerly been a
slave to the appellant's family, and had for a period of 23 years
used the name Du Boulay without interference or objection. 24
After hearing all of the evidence, Judge Woodcock gave judgment in favor of the respondent. 211 With reference to the claim
brought by the appellant, Judge Woodcock expressed his opinion by saying: "Thank [h]eaven, I know of no [l]aw which I can
be called on to administer by which such an attempt can be supported."26 The recognition of a proprietary right enabling one to
exclude others from adopting a particular name was conclusively
denied. 27 Although this ruling was intended to benefit only the
particular respondent, it did so to the detriment of those who, in
a professional capacity, invested time and labor into creating a
market from which their name could attract revenue.
The reluctance of English judges to hold in favor of plaintiffs claiming the right to control the uses to which their names
were applied continued until the case of British Medical Association u. Marsh. 28 The defendant in this action had used the initials "BMA" as the name for his chain of drug stores. 29 That
these particular letters signify to the public the institution better known as the British Medical Association was known by the
defendant. 30 By taking these letters for his own commercial venture, Mr. Marsh was attempting, the court determined, to mislead the public into believing that his drug stores were associated with one of England's most venerated institutions. 31 The
defendant advanced a most unusual argument in his attempt to
exculpate himself, claiming that the initials were in fact nothing
more than the first letter of each name in the drug store partnership: "Bushby, Marsh and Atkinson."32 This claim was found
by Justice Maugham to be "an obvious and ridiculous un23. Id. at 431.
24. Id. at 431-32.
25. Id. at 435.
26. Id. at 433.
27. Id. at 434-35.
28. 48 R.P.C. 565 (1931).
29.Id.
30. Id. at 57!.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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truth."33 Relief in the form of an injunction was granted only
due to a finding that "the acts of the defendant tend to injure
the plaintiffs in their business both by tending to cause existing
members of the Association to leave . . . and to cause qualified
medical men not yet members ... to abstain from joining."34
Thus, only due to the existence of a tangible monetary loss, was
the court willing to provide a remedy.
The unwillingness of the English courts to abandon their
rigid posture when faced with individual requests for protection
against appropriation is also reflected in the case of Dockrell v.
Dougalz.s" The facts involved another physician, Dr. Dockrell,
who had attained distinction as a specialist. 36 As plaintiff in this
case, he objected to the defendant's use of his name in an advertisement circular, which purported to link the doctor with an endorsement of a potentially harmful elixir guaranteed to cure
gout. 37 The plaintiff's inability to establish a direct financial loss
accruing from the advertisement proved fatal to his request for
an injunction. 38
Judge Williams, having relied on the cases which preceded
Dr. Dockrell's claim, stated: "in this case ... the plaintiff has
failed to prove anything more than the use of his name by the
defendant without authority."39 Having succinctly assessed the
basis for the plaintiff's claim, the denial of relief was ascribed to
the lack of precedent to support Dr. Dockrell's assertion. 40 Perhaps if the plaintiff had been held responsible for physical injury
resulting from the purchase and consumption of the elixir, the
court may have had the prerequisite damages upon which to
base a recovery for the plaintiff. This holding clearly established
that in the absence of pecuniary loss, a professional did not have
a property right in his name, and as such was without protection
against appropriation. This view was expressed in the concurring
judgment of L.J. Romer:
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

[d.
[d. at 576.
80 L.T.R. 556 (1899).
[d.
[d.
[d. at 558.
[d.
[d.
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It has been contended that the unauthorised use
of the plaintiff's name gives a cause of action; that
there is a right of property in a man's name so
that any use of that name by another will be actionable if the use is unauthorised and may be to
the detriment of the plaintiff in his profession.
There is no authority for such a proposition; it
goes too far and is unsound!l

This opinion strengthened the foundation on which defendants could escape liability for the appropriation of an individual's name or likeness. By requiring that only the manner in
which a plaintiff could demonstrate actual loss was by proving
economic injury, the court's narrowconstuction worked to preclude viable complaints.

Tolley v. J.S. Fry and Sons, Ltd. 42 is one of the most famous of the early appropriation cases. The plaintiff in Tolley
was a stockbroker by profession, who was well known for his status as an amateur golfer. 43 The defendant Fry, a firm which
manufactured chocolates,used Tolley's name accompanied by a
caricature of him playing golf in an advertisement for their
product. 44 Without obtaining the plaintiff's permission the advertisement appeared in two daily newspapers."Ci The plaintiff's
complaint alleged that a libel had been committed against him:
it appeared that he had accepted compensation for the use of his
name in conjunction with the product, and the implication that
he had been paid in his capacity as a golfer would threaten his
amateur standing."s
Evidence before the appellate court indicated that the defendant had received a letter from their advertising agents
which warned that a suggested second advertisement, involving
caricatures of two tennis amateurs, could give rise to potential
liability."7 This letter read: "[I]n tennis circles, even more than
in golf circles, the amateur status must be carefully guarded,
41. [d.

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

1 K.B. 467 (1930).
[d.
[d. at 468.
[d.
[d. at 467.
47. [d. at 469.
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hence if Cyril Tolley has any quarrel with us, it is more than
likely that both Helen Wills and Betty Nuthall would be upset
at our caricaturing them for advertising purposes.""8 The lack of
integrity on the part of the defendant is illustrated by the fact
that, knowing sales of Fry Chocolate would be enhanced by an
endorsement from Mr. Tolley, the advertisement appeared in
two newspapers, and exposed the plaintiff to what was later
found to be a libel. 49
For a brief moment, Mr. Tolley's right to regulate use of his
name and likeness was given lucid expression by Judge Greer's
statement: "[T]he defendants in publishing the advertisement in
question without first obtaining Mr. Tolley's consent, acted in a
manner inconsistent with the decencies of life, and in so doing
they were guilty of an act for which there ought to be a legal
remedy."M The defendant Fry was responsible for the harm and
embarrassment suffered by the plaintiff. III Although the desire to
reap commercial gain at the expense of another is not looked
upon favorably in other areas of the law, the drastic need for
reform regarding appropriation was ignored by Judge Greer's
eventual holding. Judge Greer distinguished the public attention
given to Mr. Tolley for his golfing achievement from the status
of an anonymous member of society: "Some men and women
voluntarily enter professions by which their nature invite publicity ... [i]t is not unreasonable in their case that they should
submit without complaint to their names and occupations and
reputations being treated as matters of public interest, and almost as public property."112 This holding, taken to the logical extreme, would grant a free license to anyone with creative or financial resources who wished to capitalize upon the fame of
others. Although the public has an interest in the personal advances made by a celebrity in his career, Judge Greer's holding
confuses the right to obtain information with a personal right
which allows only the individual figure to use his talents for
commercial exploitation. Judgment was however rendered in
favor of the plaintiff. liS In seeking to protect Mr. Tolley's ama48. [d.
49. [d. at 476.
50. [d. at 478.
51. [d.

52. [d. at 477.
53. [d. at 476.
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teur standing, the claim of libel was included almost as an afterthought. 1I4 As noted by a contemporary legal writer, "had the
plaintiff been a professional golfer he would not have succeeded
in his claim . . . as the adverse imputation would not then have
amounted to a libel."l1l1
That relief was made available to the plaintiff does not discount the fact that the opinions regarding the case were shortsighted. An amateur athelete usually progresses in his sport until he reaches the standing of a professional. Tolley's future
merchandising and endorsement potential were limited by the
defendant's advertisement. In addition to safeguarding the
plaintiff's status as an amateur, his future earning capacity
should also have been recognized.
Unfortunately, the Fry case is not helpful in seeking to establish the proposition that an individual has a viable right in
and of itself to protect the unauthorized use of his name and
likeness. In spite of the fact that judgment was in favor of the
plaintiff, the court was unwilling to make an award on the basis
of misappropriation of personality. This case illustrates that
even where a claim for misappropriation was vindicated, the tort
itself remained undeveloped as a result of the other legal remedies upon which relief was predicated. The judgments provided
in the professional cases reflect Judge Greer's holding in Tolley.1I6 Although disposed to granting protection, he was hindered
by the doctrine of precedent and the policy considerations which
almost uniformly dictated that recovery should be denied. Aside
from the financial losses by plaintiffs, the law should have been
sensitive to the element of dignity that is lost by allowing appropriation abuses to occur. Such abuses could be alleviated if English jurisprudence would accept that "any unauthorized exploitation other than for the legitimate purposes of news
reporting and free speech may be civil misappropriation. "117
The English professional cases culminate in Sim u. H.J.
54. [d. at 475.

55. Coleman, The Unauthorized Commercial Exploitation Of The Names And
Likenesses Of Real Persons, 7 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 189 (1982).
56. Tolley v. J.S. Fry & Sons, Ltd., 1 K.B. 467, 482 (1930).
57. Coleman, supra note 55, at 194.
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Heinz Co. Ltd/'s Here, the defendant, Heinz Company, engaged
an advertising firm to prepare several commercials for their
product to be directed toward a television audience. 59 The advertisements involved a cartoon figure which, due to its anonymous form, was itself innocuous, but was accompanied by a
voice which impersonated that of the plaintiff, Alistair Sim. 60
Sim, an actor whose career was confined exclusively to the stage
and film industry, sought an injunction against the defendant to
prevent the continued broadcast of the television advertisement. 61 He argued that his reputation and notoriety as an actor
were compromised by the defendant's use of his voice in conjunction with products which, plaintiff's counsel claimed, "do
not represent our client's beliefs and persons listening to the
broadcasts would think that our client was prepared, for money,
to make statements that he did not believe."62
Of paramount concern to the plaintiff was the fear that his
dignity would be lost in the eyes of both members of his profession as well as the viewing public. 63 Unlike many famous actors
of today, Alistair Sim did not want to be seen to have "traded"
on his reputation for the purpose of promoting a commodity
such as that produced by the defendant. 64
Due to the fact that the case involved proceedings for an
interlocutory injunction, the central issue, whether a passing off
action had in fact occurred, remained unresolved. In spite of the
denial of the injunction, Judge McNair noted that "it would
seem to me to be a great defect in the law if it were possible for
a party, for the purpose of commercial gain, to make use of the
voice of another party without his consent."61\ McNair's holding
was consistent with the cases previously discussed in that the
absence of tangible damage to the plaintiff was the reason for
withholding the requested injunction. 66 Indeed, had the court
been amenable to viewing the case outside the confines of the
58. 1 W.L.R. 313 (1959).
59. Id. at 314.
60.Id.
61. Id. at 314-15
62. Id. at 315.
63. Id. at 314-15
64.Id.
65. Id. at 317.
66. Id. at 317-18
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law of defamation, the matter could have been litigated on the
merits as a misappropriation. Sim v. Heinz still remains a
landmark case in the development of the need for a property
right to be recognized in appropriation cases.
The professional cases indicate the refusal by British judges
to recognize the tort of misappropriation as applied to the reputation of an individual. While the opinions often reflect disapproval regarding the taking of a name and likeness, they illustrate an effort to link liability with other well established forms
of law. As with Tolley v. J.S. Fry and Sons, Ltd., most plaintiffs,
otherwise able to recover on a claim of libel, would still be prevented from enjoining defendants, if their likenesses were used
for commercial ventures.
The same lack of judicial protection would apply to those
businessmen who, unlike the plaintiff in the Routh case, sought
recovery under a theory other than defamation. Unfortunately,
as illustrated by both Clark and Sim, a claim of defamation may
not be sufficient to provide protection against unauthorized use.
Application of property law has also proved unsuccessful, as in
the Dockrell case, when the plaintiff was unable to prevent his
reputation from being used by those engaged in the manufacture
of a fraudulent medicine.
In cases where relief was granted, there appears to be a tendency on the part of the judges to formulate the remedy to fit
within previously recognized causes of action. This is evident in
Pollard, which relied upon an implied contract, and Prince Albert, where a finding for the plaintiff was based upon a breach of
confidence.
The judgments above demonstrate the uniform refusal to
accept a right pertaining to name and likeness. Although certain
cases provide protection, there is a complete absence of litigation under the specific claim of misappropriation. As a result of
the consistent refusal on the part of British judges to grant
awards based upon the unauthorized taking of one's "personality," it is to the law of passing off that one must turn.
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II. PASSING OFF
Initially, the law of passing off was designed to protect traders from misrepresentations which ascribed to one set of goods
the goodwill established in another.67 This action was later applied to the area of commercial services, although all passing off
claims are predicated on the theory that "nobody has any right
to represent his goods as the goods of somebody else."68 Liability
under this action may arise from the straightforward taking of
another's trademark, the deceptive use of a product identification scheme and activities in which the public are confused into
thinking that the defendant's goods are those of the plaintiff.69
Injury is measured by the potential or actual loss of the plaintiff's business, and, in a successful case, will result in both an
injunction to restrain the defendant and an award of damages. 7o
This tort may be invoked against those who are unaware of the
goods sold by the plaintiff, thus making ineffective a defense
based upon innocence.71
The basic elements necessary to sustain a passing off action
have been summarized as: "(1) the plaintiff's own reputation; (2)
the defendant's representation; and (3) likelihood of damage to
the plaintiff. "72 The first criteria requires the plaintiff to establish that he owns the goodwill in either the name or reputation
of his business. 7s A successful commercial reputation, although
intangible, is the type of property which passing off seeks to protect. 74 It is therefore essential that prior to a showing of public
confusion, goodwill be proven to exist.7~ Lord MacNaghten, with
what might have been some difficulty, defined goodwill as "the
attractive force which brings in custom."76 This meaning alone
does not suggest a difference between goodwill and reputation.
67. W.

CORNISH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY; PATENTS. COPYRIGHT, TRADE MARKS AND

473 (1981).
68. Reddaway v. Banham, 13 R.P.C. 199, 204 (H.L. 1896).
69. [d. at 204-05.
70. Cornish, supra note 67, at 473.
71. [d. at 485.
72. [d. at 475.
73. [d. at 477.
74. Warnink v. J. Townend & Sons, App. Cas. 731, 735-38 (H.L. 1979).
75. [d. at 739.
76. Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Muller & Co.'s Margarine, Ltd., App. Cas.
217, 224 (H.L. 1901).
ALLIED RIGHTS
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Still, for goodwill to be established, a thriving business interest
is required, while reputation may exist independently from commercial ventures. 77
Although reputation is an important element in assessing
goodwill, the two are distinct terms best illustrated by a product
which may have a reputation but is bereft of goodwill. Passing
off actions protect the goodwill in a product by safeguarding the
business which fostered its growth.
To fulfill the second element, a representation which makes
difficult the distinction between the defendant's goods or services and those of the plaintiff must be made. 78 This representation need not be intentional nor fraudulent, but the public must
actually believe, or be likely to believe, that they are receiving
the plaintiff's product when in fact the goods are derived from
another source. 79 In the absence of a viable defense, the court
may infer that a similar name or style of packaging was used by
the defendant with the objective of appropriating the plaintiff's
goodwill. 80 Although a plaintiff is not required to prove that deception actually occurred, he or she must demonstrate that a
substantial number of the public is likely to be confused. 81 The
unlawful association of the defendant's goods with those of the
plaintiff will depend upon the existence of a common field of
activity.82 It is precisely this factor which makes passing off an
ineffective remedy for celebrities. The names and likenesses of
famous individuals frequently appear on products unrelated to
the area in which notoriety was derived. As a result, the common
field of activity requirement has made possible merchandising
schemes which could have been prevented had the parties been
involved in a similar business venture. An overlap in the business enterprises engaged in by the parties is essential, to sustain
a claim under this theory, for a difference in product or relevant
consumer market can often preclude recovery.83
77.
78.
79.
80.
1911).
81.
82.
83.

Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Budejovicky Budvar, Fleet Street Rep. 413 (C.A. 1984).
Cornish, supra note 67, at 475.
Warnink, App. Cas. at 740.
William Edge & Sons, Ltd. v. William Niccolls & Sons, Ltd., App. Cas. 693 (H.L.
Cornish, supra note 67, at 489.
McCulloch v. May, Ltd., 2 All E.R. 845, 846 (1947).
[d. at 851.
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The third and final requirement dictates that in the absence
of actual injury the plaintiff demonstrate likelihood of damage. 8 •
Most frequently, the loss occurs when misled consumers
purchase alternative goods. 8 & If the same purchaser becomes dissatisfied with what he believes to be the plaintiff's product, and
ceases entirely to buy the goods, the plaintiff's position in the
market will be threatened. Damage is therefore closely linked
with business goodwill in cases of passing off.86 The specific requirements for passing off are discussed in greater detail in the
context of the cases to follow. It is interesting to note that, although factual situations bearing all the requirements for sustaining a claim may be presented, recovery is still not easily
granted. The courts are reluctant to interfere with fair competition, and must, in passing off actions, balance the plaintiff's proprietary right in his goodwill against the interests of those engaged in a rival business. 87 Too frequently the balance is in favor
of those who capitalize on the popularity of others.
The case of McCulloch v. May, Ltd. 88 is a logical starting
point from which to examine the body of law relating to passing
off actions. The plaintiff, McCulloch, alleged the unauthorized
taking by the defendant of the name made famous by the plaintiff as "Uncle Mac."88 Mr. McCulloch was a broadcaster originally employed in 1926 by the British Broadcasting Corporation
to present a show entitled "The Children's Hour."90 Before each
program, he was introduced as "Uncle Mac" and, as a consequence of the overwhelming success of the show, he went on to
perform other functions such as charitable fund raiser, recording
personality, lecturer and author of children's books, retaining
the name Uncle Mac. 91 Unfortunately, Mr. McCulloch/Uncle
Mac was disabled, having lost a limb and the sight of one eye.92
Due to his physical hardship, the plaintiff was forced to employ
a secretary to help him reply to the huge amount of correspon84. Cornish, supra note 67, at 475.
85. Wamink, App. Cas. at 740.
86. [d. at 754.
87. Cadbury Schweppes v. Pub Squash Co. Ltd., 1 All E.R. 213 (1981).
88. 2 All E.R. 845 (1947).
89. [d. at 848.
90. [d. at 846.
91. [d. at 847.
92. [d.
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dence he received, particularly from children. 93 These letters
contained a brief mention of the plaintiff's disability, and explained why Mr. McCulloch was unable to attend the various
functions to which he was invited. 94
The defendant was the managing director of a company
which produced breakfast food. 911 The plaintiff objected to the
marketing of a cereal called "Uncle Mac's Puffed Wheat" which
included on the carton a panel which stated in part: "You know
the difficulties of travel these days, and will understand that Uncle Mac can't get about as freely as he would like to, but ... he
will always do his best to please his many friends wherever they
may be."96 Based upon the name of the cereal produced by Mr.
May's company, and the inscription on the carton, the plaintiff
sought to prove that the defendant was attempting to exploit his
personality for economic gain, and brought an action for passing
off. 97
The elements for a passing off action require the plaintiff to
show that he was in possession of a protectable property right;
that this interest was infringed by the defendant; and that this
infringement damaged the plaintiff by confusing the public into
thinking that the defendant's "profession, business or goods"
could be attributed as belonging to the plaintiff. 98 Although it
may appear that. the name and packaging of Uncle Mac's Puffed
Wheat could be construed as a blatant attempt by Mr. May to
trade on the good reputation of the plaintiff, the court held that
an action for passing off could not be sustained. 99 Judge WynnParry began his opinion by stating the familiar principle that:
"It is established beyond argument that under the law of England a man is not entitled to exclusive proprietary rights in a
fancy name in vacuo."lOO This maxim of English jurisprudence
was well entrenched in the series of professional cases which existed prior to Judge Winn-Parry's judgment, and its value as a
rule of precedent was, in his estimation, better left
93.
94.
95.
96.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 848.
97. [d. at 849.
98. [d.
99. [d. at 851.
100. [d. at 849.
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undisturbed. IOI
What is most unfortunate about this case is the finding that
because "the plaintiff is not engaged in any degree in providing
or marketing puffed wheat, how can the defendant, in using the
fancy name used by the plaintiff be said to be passing off the
goods or the business of the plaintiff."102 In dismissing Mr. McCulloch's claim on the basis that the business of producing puffed wheat was distinct from that of a broadcasting celebrity, the
judge significantly altered the potential effectiveness that the
tort of passing off could have had in controlling appropriations.
The devastating effect of the requirement that there be a causal
connection uniting plaintiffs with defendants in such cases was
aptly commented on by Mr. Frazer l03 who pointed out in a recent article:
This requirement would mean that an action in
passing off would lie in respect of appropriation
of personality only where the plaintiff carried on
the same sort of business as the one in which the
defendant had appropriated the plaintiff's personality. A rock star who does not manufacture,
or might reasonably be expected to manufacture
in the future, mints would have no remedy where
his name or likeness is used in an advertisement
for them; even a sporting personality who did not
also sell sports wear would have no action in analogous circumstances. 104

The difficult position of an English plaintiff in an action for
appropriation is not limited to the inconvenience of the common
field of activity requirement. Judge Wynn-Parry has taken a
rigid stand on the right of personality when he notes: "If I were
to accede to the plaintiff's claim I should, as I see it, not merely
be extending quite unjustifiably the scope of the action of passing off, but I should be establishing an entirely new remedy, and
that I am quite unprepared to do. "lOll
101. [d. at 851.
102. [d.
103. A solicitor and lecturer in law at the University of Newcastle Upon Tyne.
104. Frazer. supra note 2. at 289.
105. McCulloch, 2 All E.R. at 851.
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In his book, The Protection of Privacy, Mr. Wacks, a noted
legal writer, describes in detail the array of claims that can be
brought to rectify appropriations. loe But he does not mention
that, unless each element of a passing off action is pleaded and
proved, the plaintiff's complaint will be deficient and subsequently fail.
The type of wrongdoing that this tort has been designed to
correct was described as foUows: "the chief purpose of the tort of
passing off is to protect traders against a rival who seeks to acquire by means of deception, the plaintiff's reputation."lo7
Wacks later concludes that actions such as passing off are lacking in effectiveness, for the requirement that there be a common
field of activity and confusion in the mind of the public are
often difficult to prove. 108 His treatment of the subject as a viable form of protection is accurate if one considers the remedy in
its theoretical state. But in the actual litigation of these cases,
the law must be applied in its static form, which includes application of the rigid requirements necessary to sustain a claim
under this cause of action. The discrepancy between the factual
basis of the claims and the strict requirements of passing off actions has been the source of judicial weakness. A recent article lo9
assessed the reticence of the English courts to hear passing off
actions:
There has been a regrettable tendency . . . to
restict the scope of the action for passing-off by
laying down what appears to be hard and fast
rules, which may inhibit courts from dealing with
cases on the basis of the particular facts of each.
It is regrettable, because, one of the chief virtues
of a non-statutory cause of action ought to be its
adaptability to changing commercial circumstances and practices. llo

The High Court of New South Wales reacted against the
insistence on the presence of a common field of activity for
106. R. WACKS, THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY 170 (1980).
107. [d. at 169.
108. [d. at 170.
109. Morcom, Character Merchandising - A Right or Mere Opportunity? EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV., Oct. 1978, at 7.
110. [d. at 8.
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claims of passing off. The case of Henderson v. Radio Corporation l l l sharply contrasted to the decision in McCulloch, for the
Henderson plaintiff was able to sustain a passing off action without the necessity of establishing that his business was materially
similar to that of the defendant.ll2
Since the case was tried in a jurisdiction other than England, it was of persuasive authority only. Consequently, Henderson had a limited impact in Britain. The case involved the plaintiff Hendersons, professional ballroom dancers, who, as husband
and wife, had gained notoriety both in England and Australia. ll3
From the time of their emigration to Australia, twelve years
before the commencement of this action, they were engaged in
the business of public performances as well as teaching their art
to private individuals. 1H The defendant company was a distributor of record albums in Australia, and placed on the market a
record entitled "Strictly For Dancing: Vol 1."1111 Without securing the plaintiff's permission, the defendant used a photograph
of the Hendersons dancing together on the cover of the album
which gave rise to this claim for passing off.lls
Judge Sugarman initially granted an injunction to restrain
the defendant from selling the album. ll7 The opinion contains a
finding that there was a common field of activity between the
demonstrations given by the plaintiff and the defendant's production of a record suitable for dance instruction. ll8 The plaintiffs claimed that the buying public would be deceived into
thinking that the photograph on the album cover constituted an
endorsement of the record itself.ll9 On appeal, Judge Evatt determined that passing off actions were to be applied to those engaged in business.l20 He construed commercial activity as denoting any form of enterprise. 121 In a strong criticism of Judge
111. R.P.C. 218 (1969).
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

[d. at 233.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

at 219.
at 220.
at 221.

at
at
[d. at
[d. at

230.
234.

222.
234.

121. [d.
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Winn-Parry's holding in McCulloch, Judge Evatt held that if
the parties to a passing off action are involved. in a business,
"[t]here does not seem to be any reason why it should also be
necessary that there be an area, actual or potential, in which
their activities conflict."122 Judge Manning's concurring opinion
altered the traditional requirements for a passing off claim by
noting that the existence of a common field of activity was
merely a factor in determining if public confusion and damage
had occurred. 123
In dismissing the appeal, Judge Manning boldly stated "it is
going too far to say that the absence of this so called common
field of activity necessarily bars a plaintiff from relief. "l2. In
spite of the relative ease with which the Henderson court "rewrote" the law of passing off, the overall effectiveness of the
judgment is diminished by the fact that the parties were business competitors in fields closely related.l2lI As such, the court's
opinion may be classified as dicta. Since McCulloch concerned
parties with distinct business enterprises, the case is easily distinguished from the claim brought by the Hendersons.
Regardless of the jurisdictional division, the Henderson decision did have some impact in England three years later in the
case of Annabel's Ltd. (Berkeley Square) v. Schock.128 In this
action for passing off, the common field of activity requirement
was described, in a manner similar to that of the Henderson
court, as a highly relevant consideration. 127 The facts of the case
involved the successful London nightclub called Annabel's.128
The defendant company was an escort agency operating under
the same name. 129 The plaintiffs alleged that by adopting the
name and identical spelling of their nightclub, the defendant
was attempting to establish in the minds of the public that his
business was somehow associated with plaintiffs. 130
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

[d.
[d. at 236.
[d. at 242.
[d. at 234.
R.P.C. 838 (1972).
[d. at 845.
[d. at 839.
[d.
[d.
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The defendant placed advertisements in several publications including two newspapers and a guide to London. lsl These
in turn contained "a great many advertisements of various kinds
such as massage therapy, Miss Petal escorts for Paris or London
weekends,"ls2 which were followed by the defendant's
advertisement. ls3
The defendant had printed the following advetisement in
the Times newspaper: "Annabel's Mayfair Escort Agency [has]
intelligent, interesting and high standard girls. "IS4 The plaintiff's
secretary, Miss Cameron, gave evidence that in her capacity as
receptionist she received a total of six incoming telephone inquiries from women who had read the defendant's advertisement and were enthusiastic at the prospect of working as escorts. 13& Miss Cameron also stated that two women had arrived
at the back door of the club and, like those making incoming
calls, were curious as to the possibility of working for the defendant. lss What is perhaps the most persuasive piece of evidence on the issue of public confusion is the testimony given by
the plaintiff's secretary that "a few members of Annabel's Club
telephoned about the escort agency, some expressing surprise
that the [c]lub should indulge in that field of enterprise and
others ironically inquiring as to the service offered by the escort
agency."IS7 In his own defense, the defendant produced a faintly
credible proposition, claiming that the name" Annabel's" was selected so as to enable his company to be listed on the top of the
page in publications listing places of entertainment in alphabetical order .138
Judge Russell, in dismissing the defendant's appeal and upholding the award of an injunction stated: "one of the important
considerations is whether there is any kind of association . . . in
the minds of the public. . . between the field of activities of the
plaintiff and ... [that] of the defendant ... this is simply a
question in the ultimate decision whether there is likely to be
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

[d. at 840.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 841.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 842.
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confusion."ls9 Here, Judge Russell was not rejecting the requirement established in the McCulloch case, that a common field of
activity exist. Rather, his judgment focused on the fact that
public confusion ensued. l4O
Although one legal commentator, Morcom, finds from his
reading of the Annabel case that "nothing . . . could be a
clearer repudiation of the requirement of a 'common field of activity' as a rule of law,m41 the opinion delivered by Judge Russell expressly illustrates that common ground did exist between
the plaintiff and defendant. In an interesting turn of phrase, this
common field of activity was described as follows: "it can be said
that Annabel's [c]lub provides facilities to men for dining and
dancing with female partners, [t]urning it round slightly, Mr.
Schock's business is concerned with supplying for men facilities
of female partners for the purpose, among other things, of dining and dancing with them."l42
The plaintiff was awarded an injunction which Judge Russell upheld on appeap4S The requirement that there be a common field of activity between plaintiff and defendant remained
intact after his judgment. Judge Russell's opinion emphasized
the element of public confusion, and did not eliminate or overrule the McCulloch holding.
The possibility that the tort of passing off would, under
Henderson and Annabel, expand to protect current forms of
misappropriation did not materialize. The hope that the common field of activity requirement would, after Henderson, be relaxed, was dashed in the case of Lyngstad v. Anabas Products
Ltd. l44 This action concerned the Swedish pop group Abba
which sought to enjoin the defendants from producing and selling various products such as buttons and t-shirts which contained photographs of the group.l41i Abba contended, like the
Henderson plaintiff, that members of the public would assume
139. [d. at 844.
140. [d. at 845.

141. Morcom, supra note 109, at 8.
142. Annabel's, R.P.C. at 845.
143. [d. at 846.

144. Fleet Street Rep. 62 (1977).
145. [d. at 65.
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that the group had endorsed the defendant's merchandise which
would then limit their future licensing potential. 146
Judge Oliver refused the plaintiff's claim,147 and his holding
exhibits the force with which the English courts rejected the
Henderson case. The common field of activity requirement was
conclusively affirmed by his decision, which dismissed the Henderson ruling as a misunderstanding by the Australian court of
this principle of passing off.H8 Judge Oliver's opinion states:
"The expression 'common field of activity' is not, I think, a term
of art, but merely a convenient shorthand term for indicating
the need for a real possibility of confusion, which is the basis of
the action."H9 The determination by the Lyngstad court that
the public would not be deceived into associating the plaintiff
with the goods produced by the defendant resulted in what may
be termed a gratuitious license to exploit Abba's fame.
In the same year that the Lyngstad case was tried, the
copyright owners of cartoon characters called the "Wombles"
brought a claim against a company using the same name for rubbish bins produced by the defendant. lIIO This case differs slightly
from Lyngstad, in that the plaintiff had taken advantage of licensing opportunities by franchising various pictures of the
characters.1IIl The fact that the Wombles characters were involved in collecting litter in and around Wimbledon Common
was insufficient to establish a common link with the rubbish
bins marketed by the defendant.Ui2 As a result, Judge Walton
held in favor of the defendant, finding that the business of licensing copyright material was distinct from cleaning up litter. IllS This decision implicitly ignored the monetary value that
the plaintiff derived from its licensing rights. Judge Walton's
opinion also illustrates the unwillingness of English judges to
recognize the market value of a licensed name.
Any favorable contribution that the Henderson case could
146.
147.
148.
149.

[d. at 66.
[d. at 70.
[d. at 67.
[d.

150. Wombles Ltd. v. Wombles Skips Ltd., R.P.C. 99, 99 (1977).
151. [d. at 101.
152. [d. at 102.
153. [d.
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have made to passing off actions was obviated after the Lyngstad and Wombles decisions. The opinions reflect a judicial contentment with existing criteria. However, in the Ontario court of
appeal, Krouse, a professional football player, attempted to invoke the same protection offered to the Hendersons in his claim
against the Chrysler Automobile Company.164 The appellant,
Chrysler, had produced an advertising device called a "spotter"
to be used in conjunction with its television campaign to market
automobiles to those viewing professional football games. m At
the center of the spotter appeared a photograph of the respondent wearing his team uniform. 166 Krouse alleged that the use of
his photograph amounted to the misappropriation of his right to
endorse products which was afforded to him by virtue of his status as a professional athlete. 167 He was awarded damages on a
finding that a passing off had occurred. 168
At the appellate level, Judge Estey reversed the lower
court's holding, finding that the appellant's business of manufacturing automobiles could not be construed as infringing upon
the respondent's activities as a football player. m The Henderson case was distinguished because the record produced by the
defendant appealed to the same section of the consumer market
in which the plaintiffs were known, with the result that those
purchasing the album would incorrectly associate the parties. 160
Chrysler, on the other hand, was also seeking a trade advantage,
but its advertising strategy relied upon an abstract association
with the game of football. 161 Any potential for confusion in the
minds of the public was negated by the fact that the photograph
of Krouse depicted him solely as a team member and would not
imply that he was endorsing the appellant's product. 162 In denying the respondent's motion for compensation for the use of his
personality, Judge Estey commented on the refusal of the Canadian Judiciary to approve such a right: "Progress in the law is
not served by the recognition of a right which, while helpful to
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Krouse v. Chrysler Canada Ltd., 40 D.L.R.3d 15 (1978).
Id. at 16.
Id.
Id. at 19.
Krouse v. Chrysler Canada Ltd., 25 D.L.R.3d 49, 69 (1972).
Krouse, 40 D.L.R.3d at 26.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 29.
Id.
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some persons or classes of persons, turned out to be an unreasonable disruption to the community at large and to the conduct
of its commerce."163 The claim for passing off could not be maintained in light of Krouse's failure to prove that his business endeavors had been interfered with by Chrysler. The requisite element of public confusion is therefore as stricly adhered to in the
Canadian courts as it is in England.
The case of Cadbury Schweppes v. Pub Squash Co. Ltd. 164
represents a privy council review of passing off as applied in
New South Wales. The plaintiff, Cadbury Schweppes, had
placed on the Australian market a beverage called "Solo," which
was to compete with Coca-Cola. 16& Simultaneously, the plaintiff
launched an extensive advertising campaign on both radio and
television, which informed the public that Solo was both a man's
drink and reminiscent of the type of beverage sold in the past. 166
In the hope that consumers would buy Solo as an alternative to
beer, the container in which it was marketed resembled that
used for selling beer, complete with an identifiable yellow color
and medallion. 167 One year following the successful introduction
of Solo, the respondent marketed a beverage called "Pub
Squash," which utilized a similar bottle, label and advertising
strategy.168 After a 15% drop in sales, Cad bury Schweppes instituted proceedings against the defendant for passing Off.169 Judge
Powell, in the lower court, found that although the defendant
had intentionally taken advantage of the plaintiff's marketing
success, the drink produced by the defendant was distinct from
Solo.170 As such, the only offense committed by the defendant
was a taking of the plaintiff's advertising effort, which in itself
did not amount to a passing off.l7l
On appeal to the privy council, Lord Scarman affirmed the
prior ruling, having found that respondent's objective was not to
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at 30.
1 All E.R. 213 (1981).
Id. at 215.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 216.
Id. at 217.
Id. at 220.
Id.
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deceive but was instead to encroach upon a willing market. 172
The appellant was then required to establish that its product
derived from the advertising a substantial goodwill entitled to
protection. 173 The privy council was concerned with "the balance
to be maintained between the protection of a plaintiff's investment in his product and the protection of free competition."17.
Absent proof that the public was confused into thinking that
Pub Squash was the beverage produced by the appellant, there
was no misappropriation which would justify the court's intervention to restrict competition. 1711 If due to the advertising
scheme Solo had become recognizable to consumers, the appellant would have succeeded in the passing off claim, for his "intangible property right" would have been invaded. 176 Lord
Scarman's view indicates the unwillingness of the British courts
to grant a monopoly to those using a distinctive advertising
scheme. Similarly, passing off actions may prove unsuccessful
when used to prevent others from adopting similar marketing
strategies, even if accomplished within the same field of business
enterprise.
The most recent passing off case, Warnink v. Townend &
Sons,177 accurately describes the modern requirements for a
cause of action under this doctrine. Warnink involved as plaintiff a Dutch manufacturer who imported to England a beverage
called "Advocaat," which consisted of egg yolks, sugar and
brandewijn. 178 This product gained a popular reputation and
captured a substantial portion of the British market, roughly
75%.179 The defendants in the action, Keeling, produced a drink
from a blend of Cyprus sherry and dried eggs, which they advertised and sold on the English market as "Keeling's Old English
Advocaat."18o Owing to the fact that the defendant's beverage
was manufactured in England and contained wine instead of
spirits, the excise duty was appreciably lower than that imposed
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

[d. at 221.
[d.
[d. at 223.
[d. at 221.
[d. at 223.
App. Cas. 731 (H.L. 1979).
[d. at 734.
[d.
[d. at 735.
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on the plaintiffs.181 This price differential was passed on to the
purchaser, for Keeling's product was sold at a lower price of 50p
per bottle. 182
When the defendant's sales achieved a strong position in
the British market, Warnink brought a claim of passing off to
prohibit the defendant's continued sale of what is more accurately known in England as "egg flip," a beverage consisting of
virtually the same ingredients as Keeling's Old English
Advocaat. 183
At the trial court level, the plaintiff's motion for judgment
was granted, based on a finding that the defendants were misrepresenting their beverage as the genuine Advocaat. l84 However, the Court of Appeal sought to reverse and the case was
then sent before the House of Lords. 181i On behalf of Warnink, it
was urged that the plaintiffs relied on the goodwill established in
the name Advocaat to sustain their dominant position in the
British market. 186 "Such a reputation, having been built up, deserves protection and is protected by law . . . Advocaat is a
word which attracts business."187 Warnink contended that the
defendant's use of the term Advocaat was a false representation,
and as such constituted an appropriation of the plaintiff's goodwill for its own advantage in the same market. 188
Although a false representation is the cornerstone for a
passing off action,189 Lord Diplock restated the requirements
necessary to sustain an action. These remain the contemporary
standards:
(1) a misrepresentation; (2) made by a trader in

the course of trade; (3) to prospective customers
of his or ultimate consumers of goods or services
supplied by him; (4) which is calculated to injure
the business or goodwill of another trader (in the
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

at 734.
at 732.
at 735.
at 736.
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sense that it is a reasonably foreseeable consequence) and (5) which causes actual damage to a
business or goodwill of the trader by whom the
action is brought or (in a quia timet action) will
probably do SO.190

The Court of Appeal noted that this action for passing off
departed from the traditional claim, where a plaintiff seeks to
prevent a defendant from asserting that his product was in fact
produced by the plaintiff. lei Here, Warnink confined itself to
contesting the defendant's marketing of their beverage as "Advocaat," and did not contend that there was any misrepresentation as to the actual manufacturing of the beverage. le2 Counsel
for the respondents urged that the issue before the court was
one of policy, as the decision involved a choice between whether
the purchasing public or the long-standing successful
manufacurer should reap the benefit of judicial protection. le3
Citing Singer Manufacturing Co. v. Loog, the respondent relied
on the Singer finding that "[a] trader may lawfully sell a product similar in form to that of a rival trader, referring to that
trader's product by name, so long as he does so in such a way as
to avoid confusion."le4
In a concurring opinion, Lord Fraser disposed of the defendant's concern that a manufacturer would be benefitted at
the expense of the consumer, by noting that "the justification
for the passing off action to prevent such misreprentation continuing is not to protect the public (who might suffer no
prejudice from it, if they had never tasted genuine advocaat) but
to protect the appellants' property in the goodwill."le& Having
thereby established the party for whose advantage the action
was created, the court clarified the policy behind the eventual
ruling in favor of the plaintiff.le6 The protection of business
goodwill is not a concern paramount to that of the consumers'
interests, but is rather a separate and protectable interest be190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
37 -38, 38-39
195. Id.
196. Id.

at 742.
at 751.
at 737.
at 738 (citing Singer Mfg. Co. v. Loog, 8 App. Cas. IS, 22, 26-27, 29-30, 36,
(1982)).
at 754.
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longing to those who established the name sought to be
appropriated. 197

The defendant also invoked the argument that protecting
the plaintiff's right to preserve its reputation could result in
opening the floodgates to other producers who would inherit a
portion of the competitive market, having invested nothing to
warrant the economic benefit. 198 Lord Diplock was unconvinced
and stated:
The familiar argument that to extend the ambit
of an actionable wrong beyond that to which effect has demonstrably been given in the previous
cases would open the floodgates or, more ominously, a Pandora's box of litigation leaves me
unmoved when it is sought to be applied to the
actionable wrong of passing off.loO

Lord Diplock held for the plaintiff, after finding that the
prima facie elements for this tort had been proven. 200 "Where
. . . there can be discerned a steady trend in legislation which
reflects the view of successive Parliaments as to what the public
interest demands in a particular field of law, ... the common
law ... ought to proceed upon a parallel rather than a diverging
course."201 English judges are constrained by precedent to administer ineffective remedies and have often left the work of
protection to public authorities. Diplock's holding provides the
incentive for courts to look beyond the past in formulating their
opinions. The rigid requirements of passing off weigh heavily
upon future plaintiffs who wish to gain from an advancement of
the common law. In the absence of any statutory protection,
Lord Fraser appealed to the conduct of businessmen in governing their affairs as a guide to protecting invividual interests
in the market place. "[A]ny established trader is liable to have
his goodwill damaged by fair competition, ... [b]ut ... where
the misrepresentation is likely to cause damage to established
traders who own goodwill in relation to that class of goods, busi197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

at
at
at
at
at

755.
739.
744.
748.
743.
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ness morality seems to require that they should be entitled to
protect their goodwilL"202 As evidenced by the early professional
cases, the hope that individual morality will somehow curb the
acts of appropriation seems wishful thinking.
III. THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
In sharp contrast to the inability of English law to guard
against appropriation, protection in the United States is extremely well developed and effective. However, the United
States courts, like those of the United Kingdom, were fearful of
treading into waters without benefit of precedent. The absence
of well defined claims and remedies did prove daunting to American courts when first confronted with the new breed of legal
right called privacy.203 It is from this right of privacy that the
tort of appropriation of name and likeness developed. 204 There
was a steady progression from the privacy tort to the modern
appeal for the right of publicity.20l! The advent of more advanced
means of communication and entertainment, which spawned the
merchandising and advertising industry, fostered the demand
for commercial protection. 206 Appropriation claims are derived
from the basic right of privacy,207 which will be discussed in the
context of the contribution which this body of law made to the
right of publicity. When Louis Nizer, respected American attorney and author, examined the initiative taken by the U.S.
courts, he correctly analyzed:
[T]he American courts which have accepted the
right of privacy as part of their common law have
acknowledged that they were motivated by an innate feeling of natural justice . . . . The earliest
English cases avoided any mention of the right of
privacy and attempted to reach a just result by
involuted rationalizations and ingenious twisting
of ill-fitting principles ... [t]he recent matter-offact, unpretentious recognition of the right, how202. Id. at 756.
203. Nizer, The Right of Privacy - A Half Century's Developments 39
526, 535-36 (1941).
204. Prosser, supra note 3, at 401.
205. Id. at 406-07.
206. Nizer, supra note 203, at 526.
207. Prosser, supra note 3, at 401.
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ever, indicates more than anything else that it has
become firmly established in our law. 20B

Indeed, this right, which is now taken almost for granted in
much the same way as the fundamental United States constitutional rights, did not appear in the courtroom until the year
1902, in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box CO.209 The State of
New York, which was the jurisdiction in which Roberson was
tried, enacted a statute which had the effect of classifying as a
misdemeanor, as well as a tort, the use of the name, portrait or
picture of any person for "advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade" without written consent. 210 It should be noted
that this statute was limited in effectiveness to situations bearing factual resemblance to the Roberson case, for it did not in
itself provide for the creation of a right of privacy.211 However,
Nizer212 mentions that its enactment was a result of the disapproval expressed about the Roberson case. 213 As Louis Nizer reflected: "Designed to fit the facts of one particular case, the statute has never emerged from its shadow . . . In those states
which have worked the right of privacy into the fabric of their
common law, however, it has grown and altered to fit the changing conditions of modern times."214 Thus, the dissenting opinion
of Justice Grey met with the approval of the state legislature
and, as seen in the cases to follow, the courts of other
jurisdictions.
The case of Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Com,
represents the initial willingness of the courts to add to the common law a recognized and judicially sanctioned right of privacy.
This case, tried in the Supreme Court of Georgia, dealt with a
newspaper advertisement for defendant's corporation, the New
England Mutual Life Insurance Company.216 Included in the advertisement was a likeness of the plaintiff, a private individual
by the name of Paolo Pavesich, which was placed next to a pho208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Nizer, supra note 203, at 535-36.
171 N.Y. 538,64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).
N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50-1 (Conso!. 1903).
Nizer, supra note 203, at 538.
American attorney and renowned legal author.
Nizer, supra note 203, at 538.
214. [d. at 538-39.
215. 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
216. [d.
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tograph which depicted a poor and unhealthy person. 217 Underneath was a caption which illustrated the contrast between the
photographs by stating: "[t]hese two pictures tell their own
story."218 A quotation was attributed to the plaintiff, under his
picture, which claimed that he was enjoying the receipt of dividends from an insurance policy with defendant's company.219
Another caption referred to the poor individual who, by not following the plaintiff's example, was now destitute. 22o The picture
of the plaintiff which appeared in the advertisements was made
without his knowledge or consent. 221 The claim brought by the
plaintiff to protect his right of privacy was predicated on his insistence that as an individual member of society he was entitled
to control the use for which his likeness was taken. 222 The court
contended that the plaintiff was not surrendering his personal
liberty in exchange for the benefits conferred by society.223 The
court further stated that natural law should prevail, in the absence of precedent, to afford protection to individuals who suffer
unauthorized exploitation of their likenesses, as personal dignity
is harmed. 224 The court interpreted the plea that natural law
should find expression in the judiciary to mean that "[w]hen the
law guarantees to one the right to the enjoyment of his life, it
gives to him something more than the mere right to breathe and
exist. "2211
The first amendment to the United States Constitution,
freedom of speech, was mentioned as an important right which
should be accorded the highest degree of protection in U.S. jurisprudence.226 However, for purposes of the appropriation of
name and likeness rights the Constitution does not forgive or
sanction such unauthorized taking of one's name or likeness if
accomplished for private commercial gain. 227 "There is in the
publication of one's picture for advertising purposes not the
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

224.
225.
226.
227.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 69.

at 70.
at 69.
at 70.
at 74.
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slightest semblance of an expression of an idea, a thought, or an
opinion, within the meaning of the constitutional provision
which guarantees to a person the right to publish his sentiments
on any subject."228 For this reason the court was able to concentrate on the legal wrong committed by the defendant in using
the plaintiff's photograph to promote the sale of life
insurance. 229
Judge Cobb, in formulating his opinion, made reference to
the Roberson case, and the argument advanced in that case, that
to allow recovery for an invasion of the right of privacy would
open the floodgates of litigation. 230 Cobb found that this concern
was not a sufficient reason for denying legal redress to aggrieved
plaintiffs.2S1 Thus, the right of privacy was afforded the same
right to enforcement as traditional claims brought, for example,
under the contract theory.2S2 Cobb ascribed the reluctance of
judges to accept a right of privacy to the belief that, because the
cases before them were unique factually, the right was perceived
not to exist.233 Cobb's reasoning, as applied in the Pavesich case,
stands in marked opposition to the Roberson holding. Referring
to the photographs in the advertisement, Judge Cobb stated:
"The defendant insurance company and its agent had no more
authority to display them in public for the purpose of advertising the business in which they were engaged than they would
have had to compel the plaintiff to place himself upon exhibition for this purpose. "234
The factual similarity of the Roberson and Pavesich cases
makes it clear that the holding which provided recovery in the
latter instance could have easily been granted to the Roberson
plaintiff. In the three years between these two cases, the law had
undergone a metamorphosis in which precedent was discarded
to accommodate the need for recognition of this important right.
The development of the privacy right from its genesis in the article by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis to its final
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

at 80.
at 77.
at 80.
at 77.
at 79.
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expression by Judge Cobb spanned sixteen years. This cause of
action has exerted a strong impact in American jurisprudence, as
evidenced by the vast number of cases currently litigated under
this right. It is almost unthinkable that plaintiffs were ever denied the ability to advocate their commercial appropriation
claims. This surprise is expressed in the language used by Judge
Cobb when giving judgment for the plaintiff:
So thoroughly satisfied are we that the law recognizes, within proper limits, as a legal right, the
right of privacy, and that the publication of one's
picture without his consent by another as an advertisement, for the mere purpose of increasing
the profits and gains of the advertiser, is an invasion of this right, that we venture to predict that
the day will come that the American bar will marvel that a contrary view was ever entertained by
judges of eminence and ability, just as in the present day we stand amazed that . . . Lord Hale,
with perfect composure of manner and complete
satisfaction of soul, imposed the death penalty for
witchcraft upon ignorant and harmless women. 2311

Having denounced the decision in Roberson, the court established the right of privacy as a firmly rooted legal principle. 286 Historically, Pavesich is cited as the leading case.287 However, once the right of privacy was recognized in the United
States, the new tort required further definition and polish. Dean
Prosser, former dean of the University of California at Berkeley,
School of Law (Boalt Hall), writing in 1960,238 elaborated on the
then comparatively novel tort, and found that it comprised not
one but rather four distinct interests. 239 In spite of the fact that
each interest shares the title "privacy," the rights which flow to
a plaintiff are independent under each type of invasion. 240 The
privacy right is divided into four separate torts.241 Dean Prosser
described those torts as follows:
235. [d. at 80-81.
236. [d. at 81.
237. Prosser, supra note 3, at 386; Nizer, supra note 203, at 535; Nimmer, The
Right Of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203 (1954).
238. Prosser, supra note 3, at 383.
239. [d. at 389.
240. [d.
241. [d.
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1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs.
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts
about the plaintiff.
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false
light in the public eye.
4. Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage,
of the plaintiff's name or likeness. 242

This classification provides a variety of causes of action. While
an acknowledgment of each tort is important to a discussion of
the development of the right of privacy, the final category, involving appropriation, is the focus of this inquiry. The issues to
follow will be limited to the appropriation concerns.
IV. THE RIGHT TO PUBLICITY
To establish an appropriation, a plaintiff must prove that
his name or likeness has been taken by a defendant for the defendant's commercial advantage. 248 With respect to the taking of
an individual's name, Prosser has distinguished economic gain
from harmless use: "Unless there is some tortious use made of it,
anyone can be given or assume any name he likes. The
Kabotznicks may call themselves Cabots, and the Lovelskies become the Lowells, and the ancient proper Bostonian houses can
do nothing about it but grieve."244 Once it is established that a
name or likeness was taken for its value as a commodity, the
next step is to prove that exploitation occurred for the benefit of
a Defendant. 2411 In most instances, the benefit is a monetary
gain, or the furthering of a business or commercial interest. This
aspect separates appropriation from the other three privacy
torts, for the interest sought to be protected is not freedom from
personal affronts but freedom from a proprietary taking. 246 Indeed, while a plaintiff might feel that his dignity or pride has
been wounded, this injury is secondary to the loss of capita1. 247
For example, celebrities frequently object to the taking of what
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

Id.
[d.
[d. at 403.
[d. at 405.
[d. at 406.
Rader, supra note I, at 232.
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is termed their "right of publicity."248 Although the Pavesich
case guaranteed that a right to privacy would be judicially protected, the doctrine of appropriation required expansion to meet
the needs of a technologically advanced society.249 While private
individuals had the ability to prevent invasion, relief was needed
for those in the public eye who sought to exclude others from
gratuitously taking their notoriety.2l1o The right to publicity was
therefore a logical development from the right to privacy.2111 The
recognition of a right of privacy provided a solid foundation for
recognition of the right of publicity.m The influence of Warren
and Justice Brandeis was important to development of a right of
publicity.m Mention of this fact was made by Bloustein, Professor of Law at New York University School of Law, when he advances the proposition that publicity rights are the beneficiaries
of the advances made by the tort doctrine of privacy:
[T]he very characterization of these cases as involving a "right to publicity" disguises the important fact that name and likeness can only begin to
command a commercial price in a society which
recognizes that thefe is a right to p,rivacy, a right
to control the conditions under which name and
likeness may be used.2&'

This suggests that the need for commercial protection is
distinct from the need for privacy.21111 In economic terms, licenses
which grant the use of a likeness for publicity purposes negate
the tort of privacy altogether. m Put another way, the right of
publicity is the legal status which allows the right of privacy to
be made into a commodity and sold. m The difference between
these interests has been aptly described by the renowned legal
commentator Rader:
248. Nimmer, supra note 237, at 203.
249. [d.

250. Berkman, The Right of Publicity - Protection For Public Figures and Celebrities, 42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 527, 533 (1976).
251. Rader, supra note I, at 228.
252. [d. at 229.
253. Prosser, supra note 3, at 383.
254. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV, 962, 989 (1964).
255. [d.
256. [d.
257. [d.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1988

35

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1988], Art. 3

336 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18:301

For 'right of privacy' actions, the injured party attempts to stop the publication of the damaging
material whereas a 'right of publicity' plaintiff
may not object to the commercial use of his name
or likeness so long as it is or becomes authorized
and he is paid for the use . . . . A private individual, not a celebrity, fails to create a tangible and
saleable product by associating his name or likeness with the product because his name or likeness does not ordinarily have commercial value.268

The development of the entertainment industry creates a
capacity to produce revenue which could not have been anticipated when the tort of privacy was first envisioned. 2119 As a result
of the rapid progress in communications, the effectiveness of the
privacy right has decreased. 260
Those who have carefully nurtured a career dependent upon
public popularity should be entitled to preserve financial gains
accruing from publicity.261 Public interest is a vital ingredient to
sustaining popularity, whether one is a recording artist or a
prominent athletic figure. 262 Like a lawyer who receives remuneration in exchange for legal advice, the labor invested by a
celebrity should be rewarded by safeguarding the profits which
flow from advertising and other exploitation of his or her person
for economic gain. 268
The right to publicity was discussed in the case of Haelan
Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum. Inc. 264 The case involved two competing manufacturers of chewing gum. 2611 The
plaintiff promoted his product by entering into exclusive contracts with famous baseball players which enabled him to market their photographs in association with the sale of his gum. 266
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

Rader, supra note 1, at 232-33.
Nimmer, supra note 237, at 204.
Id.
Id. at 216.
Id. at 217.
Id.
202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
Id. at 867.
Id.
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In America, it is extremely popular for children to collect
baseball cards. These cards include, on one side, a photograph of
a player in uniform, and on the back information relating to the
individual player's career. Such cards are sold in packets which
contain chewing gum and provide a strong incentive to purchase
a particular brand. Through an assignment, the defendant in
Haelan received the right to use the baseball players' photographs in connection with the sale of his competing brand. 267 At
trial, counsel for the defendant maintained that the plaintiff was
not entitled to recovery under the right of privacy, because, as a
personal right, it was non-assignable. 266 The defendant further
suggested that the plaintiff's contract amounted only to a release
which for the term of the contract precluded the player from
suing the plaintiff for invasion. 269 The court conceded that the
right of privacy vested exclusively in the baseball player but
nevertheless recognized the right to publicity:
We think that, in addition to and independent of
that right of privacy. . . a man has a right in the
publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the right to
grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his picture, and that such a grant may validly be made
"in gross," i.e., without an accompanying transfer
of a business or of anything else. Whether it be
labelled a "property" right is immaterial; for here,
as often elsewhere, the tag "property" simply
symbolizes the fact that courts enforce a claim
which has pecuniary worth. This right might be
called a "right of publicity" [and] [t]his right of
publicity would usually yield them no money unless it could be made the subject of an exclusive
grant which barred any other advertiser from using their pictures. 27o

The Haelan court distinguished the right of publicity from
the right to privacy.271 Judge Frank noted for example that publicity rights are assignable. 272 It is that which makes it possible
for a celebrity to control the profitability of his name and likeId. at 869.
Id. at 867.
Id.
Id. at 868.
271. Id.
272. [d. at 869.

267.
268.
269.
270.
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ness in the competitive marketplace of merchandising and endorsements.278 With the often abrupt changes in public trends
and the relatively short careers of athletes and celebrities it is
vital, in the absence of career security, to provide such individuals with the bargaining power necessary to the granting of
licenses. 274
The advertising industry is an important secondary market
for public figures. 2711 The substantial income generated in the
area is an important consideration for those involved in the entertainment and sports industries. 278 As one legal writer noted,
"the notion that, absent some compelling public interest, people
are entitled to the benefits of their efforts was an important justification for the expansion of the initial privacy model of the
tort. "277
Additionally, an increased control on the standard of advertising content would result if public figures were provided with
the ability to bargain for the use of their names and likenesses. 278 The commercial industry has capitalized on the appeal
of endorsements, which often result in increased consumption. 279
Many individuals decide to buy a product simply by the virtue of the fact that a film star or athlete has appeared with it.280
The reasons for the success of a product may be as varied as the
items themselves. 281 One explanation for this psychological phenomenon may be a subconscious desire to associate with the celebrity, using the most instantly available method at hand: i.e.,
select the product enjoyed by that star.282 Another more negative incentive may be a public belief that the promotion is a
warranty.283 This is most likely to occur when the product adver273. Id. at 868.
274. Berkman, supra note 250, at 537.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 533.
277. Denicola, Institutional Publicity Rights: An Analysis of the Merchandising of
Famous Trade Symbols, 75 TRADEMARK REP. 41, 65 (1984).
278. Treece, Commercial Exploitation of Names, Likenesses and Personal Histories, 51 TEX. L. REV. 637, 647 (1973).
279. Id. at 644.
280. Id. at 645.
281. Id. at 646.
282. Id. at 645.
283. Id.
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tised is within the same area in which the celebrity achieved distinction. 284 Consumers may therefore be misled into purchasing
inferior products simply because such items are used by figures
who command respect. The potential for this type of abuse provides an additional incentive to celebrities who, by withholding
permission, may prevent their names or likenesses from being
misused for promotional purposes. 28 1\ This view was elucidated
in a law review article:
If society chooses to allow uses of names and likeness in advertising, it might prefer that consumers not be misled about the willingness of a celebrity to associate himself with a product or service.
Similarly, society might decide that the "emulating" behavior of consumers would channel itself
more acceptably if the persons emulated had
some control over the decision to link their names
and likenesses with particular products. 286

Consumers as well as public figures would be benefitted by
such control, for it would provide celebrities with a stronger position when negotiating with those wishing to use their fame for
commercial purposes. Additionally, if the product to be sold is in
conflict with the aims or beliefs of the celebrity, or is unfit for
sale, the use of name and likeness could be denied altogether. 287
The recognition of a right of publicity as a property right was
imperative if worthwhile controls were to be placed on the advertising and merchandising industries.288
The conflict and uncertainty exhibited by American courts
who grappled with the fundamental disctinction between a celebrity's right of privacy and the right to publicity is expressed
in the cases to follow. Although the Haelan decision is important insofar as it designated publicity as a separate property
right, much confusion reigned in subsequent cases. Complications in judicial reasoning could have been avoided if Haelan
had been strictly followed. Yet, as Professor Nimmer points out
"by the very nature of our judicial process, a new principle of
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

[d.
[d. at 647.
[d.
[d. at 642-43.
[d. at 647.
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law can never be completely embodied in anyone decision."289
The right of publicity is frequently raised when the courts are
presented with public figure plaintiffs.290 This right is extremely
useful: it encompasses not merely a claim for remuneration for
unauthorized use of name and likeness, but recompense for the
affront to personal dignity.291
Often a celebrity's image will be inconsistent with the product for which his likeness is used. For this reason "[t]he economic injury, resulting from an appropriation of a celebrity's
identity should not obscure the concurrent harm to personal integrity and autonomy."292 The distinction between a celebrity's
identity and the product for which his likeness was used, formed
the basis of the plaintiff's claim in O'Brien v. Pabst Sales CO.293
The parties were characterized in a unique manner by
Judge Hutcheson: "Plaintiff, in physique as in prowess as a
hurler, a modern David, is a famous football player. Defendant,
in bulk, if not in brass and vulnerability, a modern Goliath, is a
distributor of Pabst beer."294 In 1939, Davy O'Brien was selected
to pose as the most popular football player of the year for publicity pictures to be taken by his university.2911 The defendant, in
an effort to increase sales, produced a football calendar in which
the plaintiff's photograph appeared accompanied by the words
"Pabst [f]amous [b]lue [r]ibbon [b]eer."296
As a member of an organization called "[T]he Allied Youth
of America," O'Brien used his fame to promote the organization's theme, which discouraged the consumption of alcoholic
beverages. 297 The plaintiff had been approached on several occasions with offers to endorse various alcoholic drinks, but he consistently refused. 298 After learning of the association of his pho289. Nimmer, supra note 237, at 222.
290. Hefter & Besha, Character Merchandising in the USA: A Search for Definable
Remedies and a Warning of Potential Liability, INDUS. PROP. L. 592 (1978).
291. Denicola, supra note 277, at 66.
292. Id.
293. 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1942).
294. Id. at 168.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 169.
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tograph with a nationwide advertisement for beer, he brought a
claim for invasion of privacy against the defendant. 299 The holding, rendered in favor of the defendant, relied upon the proposition that as the most publicized player, O'Brien had impliedly
waived any right of privacy.300 The court determined this by the
fact that over 800 photographs of the plaintiff were provided to
magazines without his objection. 301 O'Brien's contention that the
calendar would suggest to the public that the players listed were
sanctioning the consumption of beer was found by the court to
be lacking in merit. 302
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Holmes found that the defendant was in fact liable for appropriating the plaintiff's property right by using his photograph for the purpose of advertising. 303 Relying upon the standard practices engaged in by
advertising companies, who frequently offered substantial monetary incentives for the use of famous players likenesses, Holmes
decried the plight of those like the plaintiff who were left without legal redress: 304 "The decision of the majority leaves the appellant without remedy for any non-libelous use made of his picture by advertisers of beer, wine, whisky, patent medicines, or
other non-contraband goods, wares, and merchandise. It also
places every other famous stage, screen and athletic star in the
same situation."30I1 This may seem late when one notes that the
first mention of the need for privacy occurred in what may only
be described as a landmark article, The Right To Privacy,306
published in 1890. This article was motivated by the newspaper
practice of engaging in gossip which exposed the personal idiosyncrasies and habits of the wealthy.307
In particular, the newspapers of Boston chose to write in
glaring detail about the parties given by Mrs. Samuel D. Warren. 308 William Prosser described the events which inspired War299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

[d. at 168.
[d. at 169.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 171.
[d.
[d.
Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
[d. at 196.
Prosser, supra note 3, at 383.
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ren and Brandeis to advocate so vigorously the need for a recognized right of privacy:
It was the era of "Yellow Journalism," when the
press had begun to resort to excesses in the way
of prying that have become more or less commonplace today; and Boston was perhaps, of all the
cities in the country, the one in which a lady and
a gentleman kept their names and their personal
affairs out of the papers. The matter came to a
head when the newspapers had a field day on the
occasion of the wedding of a daughter, and Mr.
Warren became annoyed. It was an annoyance for
which the press, the advertisers and the entertainment industry were to pay dearly over the
next 70 years. 309

The article, produced by two of America's most famous attorneys, Warren and Brandeis, launched a fervent attack on the
press for failing to be an impartial observer in the recording of
events. 3lO Their article generated the spirit needed to protect individuals from unwanted injection into the public forum:
The press is overstepping in every direction the
obvious bounds of propriety and of decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the
vicious, but has become a trade, which is pursued
with industry as well as effrontery . . . . No enthusiasm can flourish, no generous impulse can
survive under its blighting influence. 3ll

In formulating the argument in favor of creating a privacy
right, Warren and Brandeis looked at two English cases, the first
of which is Prince Albert v. Strange. 312 The facts of this 1849
case involved a request by the Prince that the defendant be enjoined from placing on exhibition and offering for sale a catalog
containing etchings made by the Queen and Prince for their own
amusement. 313 The defendant allegedly came into posession of
the prints when an employee of the royal printer made impres309.
310.
311.
312.
313.

[d.
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 306, at 196.
[d.
41 Eng. Rep. 1171 (1849).
[d.
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sions of the etchings. 3a Although the defendant denied that his
possession of the works occurred through surreptitious means,
the court enjoined the exhibition, but did not disturb the publication of the catalog. m In spite of defendant's willingness to return all the etchings in his possession and, "as a loyal and dutiful subject, in every respect comply with the wishes of the
Queen,"316 he insisted upon the right to reproduce the catalog. 317
On behalf of the Prince, the solicitor general argued: "The interference of the [c]ourt is not asked for in this case on the ground
of decorum or good taste, but on the general principle that this
[c]ourt will protect every person in the free and innocent use of
his own property."318 Warren and Brandeis, in their enthusiasm
to find initial stirrings of the privacy doctrine in the English
courts, appear to have grasped the reasoning in the Prince Albert case too tightly. The opinion addresses the propriety of
maintaining protection for property rights with some ancillary
discussion of the breach of confidence in the printer's workmen. 319 Indeed, while privacy may have been what Prince Albert
sought to protect via the injunction, the means by which he
achieved it remain within the context of a property right. 320 A
similar view was taken in measuring the relative importance accorded to the case: "Warren and Brandeis discerned in this decision 'merely an instance of the enforcement of the more general
right of the individual to be left alone' but ... the decision is
based mainly on the right of property which the plaintiff had in
the prints. "321
The next English case the American courts relied on to support the proposition that privacy was an interest worthy of protection was Pollard v. Photographic Co. m This action, tried in
1888, was brought against the Photographic Company for the
unauthorized use of the plaintiff's photograph in an advertisement. 323 The plaintiff, Mrs. Pollard, entered defendant's store
314.
315.
316.
317.
31S.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.

[d. at 1172.
[d. at 1173.
[d. at 1174.
[d.
[d. at 1175.
[d.
[d. at 1176.
R. Wachs, supra note 106, at 5.
60 L.T.R. 41S (1SSS).
[d. at 419.
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with the intention of having several photographs taken of herself.324 Without her authorization, the plaintiff's portrait was
displayed in the defendant's store window.8211 At trial, the defendant's argument that a photographic negative is the property
of the photographer and available for his use in the absence of
illegal acts such as libel or slander failed.326 Judge North, in delivering his opinion, analogized the relationship between customer and photographer to that of attorney and client. 327 He
claimed that an element of confidentiality existed in both relationships.32B By reproducing for his own use photographs taken
from the plaintiff's portrait, the defendant was, in the judge's
opinion, liable for breach of faith.S29 Additionally, the opinion
illustrated the belief that, absent an express agreement between
the photographer and his subjects, prints taken without consent
amounted to a breach of contract.330 The description of the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant in this case
would appear to designate the abuse as existing exclusively
within the realm of either contract or trust. However, the reading of the Pollard case by Warren and Brandeis would suggest
that the legal terms "trust" and "contract" were used to denote
a privacy interest. Failing to ascertain any evidence of the privacy doctrine in English law, Warren and Brandeis, discussing
Pollard remarked, "since the latest advances in photographic art
have rendered it possible to take pictures surreptitiously, the
doctrines of contract and of trust are inadequate to support the
required protection and the law of tort must be resorted to."SS1
The lack of precedent in England did not inhibit Warren
and Brandeis, who argued that a new approach was needed if
American jurisprudence were to provide an effective method of
protection against invasions of privacy.332 But, a reluctance to
depart from the status quo was clear in the first few cases which
tested the theory of a privacy right. One of the most famous of
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 420.
[d.
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 306, at 211.
[d.
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these cases was Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box CO.333 tried
in 1902. The case involved an ordinary individual, Abigail M.
Roberson, who sued the defendant for using her photograph
without permission in an advertisement for his product, baking
flour. 334 The Franklin Mills Co. reproduced the plaintiff's photograph on cartons of flour with a caption which read "[f]lour of
the [f]amily."33& Below this caption, in smaller print, appeared
the name of the second defendant: "Rochester Folding Box Co,
Rochester, NY. "336
The use of Miss Roberson's likeness produced an immediate
physical reaction in the plaintiff, subsequently diagnosed as nervous shock. 337 Due to the overt display of the defendant's product in stores, markets and other areas to which the public was
admitted, the photograph was recognized by friends and acquaintances of the plaintiff. 338 It was later discovered that her
photograph appeared on at least 25,000 cartons marketed
throughout America and internationally.339 The plaintiff requested a permanent injunction as well as $15,000 damages. 34o
The court recognized that the plaintiff's complaint was predicated on a new, as yet unrecognized right.341 The judge held in
favor of the plaintiff, notwithstanding the lack of precedent for
his decision. 342 The court found that the defendant's use of her
likeness for economic advantage in furthering its own business
interests constituted an invasion of her privacy right, which the
court characterized as "the right to be let alone. "343
On appeal, Justice Parker reversed the lower court's holding
on the theory that it was the province of the legislature to enact
such a novel principle and not that of the court which must
abide by previous decisions. 344 Mention was also made of the
early English cases, which do not themselves provide a recogni333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.

171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 448.
Id. at 442.
Id. at 443.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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tion of the right of privacy. Fearful that the floodgates would be
open to a plethora of claims if a ruling for the plaintiff were
granted, the court refused to recognize a right of privacy.s4&
Louis Nizer, a U.S. attorney best known for his legal writing,
astutely commented on the rationale behind Justice Parker's
holding: "The reason for the court's r~ling was its fear that the
recognition of the right of privacy would result in a deluge of
litigation which would make it impossible to prevent the doctrine from being extended step by step until it embraced all
sorts of absurdities."S4& Justice Parker attempted to mitigate the
harshness of his decision by directing counsel to the penal code
section 242, which contains sanctions for malicious publication. 347 This may provide a civil remedy at common law or allow
the instigation of criminal proceedings for cases involving the
publication of a photograph if the plaintiff is able to prove that
the material constituted a libel. 348 This attempt to soften his
judgment was meaningless, for it was asserted at trial that the
plaintiff was not libeled by the photograph. S49 Indeed, due to the
quality of the likeness the plaintiff's friends were able to identify
Miss Roberson as the face in the advertisement. m
The case contains an agressive dissent by Justice Grey who
argued that the plaintiff had suffered a serious wrong which
should be remedied if not at law then in equity.3&l Courts of equity were created for instances such as this, where one seeking
redress was unable to formulate a claim recognizable at law. m
Justice Grey found it unthinkable that protection could be afforded in Prince Albert and Pollard on the basis of a property
claim, while it was denied in the present action. S&S He noted
that, in Roberson, the defendant's acts were just as reprehensible as if they had taken for their own monetary gain a writing or
etching created by the plaintiff.su As to the inability of the common law to provide redress for actions such as those of the de345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.

[d.
Nizer, supra note 203, at 532.
Roberson, 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).
[d.
[d. at 442.
[d.
[d. at 449.
[d.
[d. at 451.
[d. at 450.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol18/iss2/3

46

Buchanan: Appropriation of Personality

1988]

APPROPRIATION OF PERSONALITY

347

fendant, Justice Grey stated:
It would be a reproach to equitable jurisprudence
if equity were powerless to extend the application
of the principles of common law or of natural justice in remedying a wrong, which, in the progress
of civilization, has been made possible as the result of new social or commercial conditions. m
After Roberson a strong sentiment developed that it was unconscionable for the law to turn its back on a plaintiff who, like
Abigail Roberson, suffered embarrassment and illness due to the
wrongful taking of her likeness. 3116 The time was ripe to develop
new legal remedies. The effect of the decision had almost instantaneous impact.3117
Public figures litigating claims based on the right of privacy
were to encounter substantial difficulty because of the courts
holding that notoriety constituted an implied waiver.3118 This
twist in judicial reasoning proved daunting to those who, like
Davey O'Brien having developed a public image, were to be denied the opportunity to litigate on the issue of privacy. Justice
Holmes, in his dissenting opinion theorized that, in renouncing
his right of privacy, the plaintiff received in exchange a right to
publicity.m
Since publicity is, after Haelan, considered to be a property
right, a celebrity's control over the use of his likeness would remain inviolate from defenses raised by defendants such as
Pabst.
Turning from the athletic sphere to that of the motion picture industry, the case of Paramount Pictures v. Leader Press 360
illustrates that film stars are also without legal protection in litigating under the guise of privacy. This case was brought by Paramount Studios to enjoin the defendant from manufacturing
355.
356.
& COMPo
357.
358.
359.
360.

[d. at 449.
Yang, Privacy: A Comparative Study of English and American Law, 15 II'/T'L
L.Q. 175, 181 (1966).
[d.
Nimmer, supra note 237, at 204.
O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1942).
106 F.2d 229 (10th Cir. 1939).
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and offering for sale items which related to films produced by
them,S81 Counsel for the plaintiff urged that advertising is an important tool which, if correctly executed, communicates to the
public information which is calculated to ensure star status to
their actors,882 The products sold by Leader Press were described by the plaintiff as follows: "[T]hey, [defendants] incorporate therein pictures, cartoons, and caricatures of the stars
and featured players . . . in an inartistic, grotesque and inferior
manner."888 In particular, the plaintiff objected to a picture of
Claudette Colbert, which the defendant produced following her
performance as Cleopatra. 884 Due to poor workmanship, Miss
Colbert's head appeared to be that of a negress. 886 In granting
judgment for Paramount, the court found that the defendant's
sale of items to film theaters had induced a breach of the contract between the plaintiff and its exhibitors.888 By entering the
public forum as a famous actress, Miss Colbert's only claim
could have been based on the right of publicity, for like Davey
O'Brien, notoriety would have precluded recovery on an action
to preserve her privacy.887
The decisions continued to represent a growing judicial uncertainty regarding application of the right of privacy in the context of a celebrity,88S The distinction between the right to be left
alone as advanced by Justices Warren and Brandeis, and the
prevention of appropriation through the right of publicity remained unclear.s89 In cases where a public figure was granted
judgment, the courts appeared to arbitrarily select one of the
two rights.870 The case brought by Muhammad Ali against
Playgirl magazine appealed for recognition of both of these
rights. 871
Muhammad Ali, until his defeat by Leon Spinks, was the
Id. at 230.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 231.
Id.
Id. at 232.
Nimmer, supra note 237, at 205.
Nimmer, supra note 237, at 204.
Berkman, supra note 250, at 527.
370. Id.
371. Ali v. Playgirl Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).

361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
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heavyweight boxing champion of the world. 872 He sued Playgirl
magazine for using a portrait in its February 1978 issue which
depicted a black man sitting in the corner of a boxing ring wearing nothing but tape on his hands. 878 Although the portrait was
an illustration not a photograph, the physical resemblance to Ali
was undisputed. 874 The caption underneath read "Mystery
Man,"8711 and was followed by a line which referred to the figure
as "The Greatest."87S The court took judicial notice of Ali's successful efforts to characterize himself in the media as "the greatest" by referring to the cover of Time magazine, issued after the
Ali-Spinks fight, which read" 'The Greatest' is [g]one."877
Muhammad Ali alleged that the defendant was liable for invading both his statutory right of privacy as well as his common
law right to publicity.378 Following the issuance of a preliminary
injunction, counsel for the defense moved that, despite cessation
of distribution of the issue in the domestic market, sales of the
magazine be allowed to continue in England. 879 In support of its
motion, the defendant claimed that the right of privacy was inapplicable to the plaintiff who as a public figure was not entitled
to invoke the protection offered under the privacy statute. 880
Judge Gagliardi resolved the issue by holding that Ali's status as a celebrity did not prevent him from asserting a right to
privacy under New York statutory law. 381 "That [plaintiff] may
have voluntarily on occasion surrendered [his] privacy, for a
price or gratuitously, does not forever forfeit for anyone's commercial profit so much of [his] privacy as [he] has not relinquished."882 This decision clearly acknowledged that if one ventures into the public view, there is still a concurrent right to
keep private certain aspects of one's personal life which, if made
available for comment, would result in an abuse of personal dig372. [d. at 725 n.!.
373. [d. at 725-26.
374. [d. at 726.
375. [d. at 726-27.
376. [d. at 727.
377. [d. at 727 n.8.
378. [d. at 726.
379. [d. at 730.
380. [d. at 727.
381. [d. at 728.
382. Id. at 727 (citing Booth v. Curtis Publishing Co., 15 A.D. 2d 343, 351-52, 223
N.Y.S. 2d 737, 745 (1962)).
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nity.S8S Thus, public celebrities are, under the Ali decision, able
to claim the same right to privacy as any other private
individual.
In addressing the plaintiff's second claim, that the publication of his likeness was a violation of his right to publicity,
Judge Gagliardi noted that most New York courts do not distinguish the property right of publicity from privacy claims. S84 The
right to publicity was described as analogous to the concept of
goodwill developed by a company.m In granting the plaintiff's
right to protect this interest, Gagliardi reflected that his judgment was "the straightforward one of preventing unjust enrichment by the theft of good will [sic]."s88 The holding in this case
accommodated a finding that the portrait amounted to the unlawful appropriation of Muhammad Ali's likenesss87 as well as
an invasion of his separate and distinct right to privacy. S88
Not all courts have recognized the theory that publicity and
privacy rights may be mutually exclusive for purposes of adjudication. s89 The lack of independent analysis accorded to each interest does not always result in a disadvantage to plaintiffs who
are seeking to vindicate their claims for legal protection. S90
In Palmer v. Schonhorn Enterprises Inc.,s91 four wellknown professional golfers brought an action for injunction
against the defendant who, in marketing a board game, used the
plaintiffs' names in association with an advertisement. s92 The
game consisted of "profiles and playing charts" which specified
biographical information about inter alia, the four plaintiffs. S9S
In spite of the fact that the information used by Schon horn Enterprises was accurate, the defendant did not obtain consent
383. [d. at 728.
384. [d.
385. [d.
386. [d. at 728-29 (citing Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law- Were Warren and Brandeis
Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 331 (1966)).
387. [d. at 729.
388. [d. at 728.
389. Palmer v. Schonhorn Enter. Inc., 96 N.J. Super. 72, 232 A.2d 458 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1967).
390. [d. at 462.
391. [d. at 458.
392. [d. at 459.
393. [d.
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prior to production and distribution of the game. 394 The defendant's failure to comply with a request by the plaintiffs that they
be disassociated with the product resulted in litigation. 39& At
trial, it was conceded by the defendants that the use of the golfers' names increased the sales potential of the game. 398 For their
part, the plaintiffs urged that the unwarranted taking of their
names not only reduced their potential to receive remuneration
from other manufacturers, but also infringed their right to privacy.39? Predictably, defense counsel argued that the plaintiffs
were not entitled to a right of privacy since their entry into a
professional sport operated as a waiver.398 Schonhorn also maintained that the information used by them in the game was "public data and available to all, it should not be denied the privilege
of reproducing that which is set forth in newspapers, magazine
articles and other periodicals. "399
In his opinion, Judge Horn recognized that the act of republishing biographical information regarding a celebrity was within
the protection afforded by the first amendment of the United
States Constitution, and was not a violation of privacy in a strict
sense!OO The plaintiffs' complaint, however, alleged that the defendant's use of the information was to further its own pecuniary advantage in a commercial market. 401
Schonhorn's appropriation was thus viewed as an impediment to the free enjoyment of profit which should flow to the
plaintiffs as a result of effort expended in the golfing profession!02 Judge Horn's view in granting judgment for the plaintiffs
was that a contrary ruling would prove fundamentally unfair!03
As noted by one legal writer: "Fortunately, the court did not
commit the further error of proclaiming that public figures sacrifice, or waive, their rights of publicity as to their names or biog394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

at 460.
at 462.
at 459.
at 462.
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raphies, thereby precluding any relief."404 By permitting the
plaintiffs to recover in spite of their standing as celebrities, the
privacy doctrine was, in this instance, expanded to include the
right to publicity.m Here, a monetary interest was protected not
as a property right, but under the belief that public figures do
not sacrifice their privacy even in a commercial context.4°6 Although as far as the plaintiffs were concerned, the ends justified
the means, the court neglected to seize the chance to distinguish
between a property, as opposed to a personal, right. Three years
later, a strikingly similar fact situation arose.
In Uhlaender v. Henricksen,407 the plaintiff sued on behalf
of all major league baseball players to enjoin the defendant from
using their names in the production of two board games called
"Big League Manager Baseball"408 and "Negamco's Major
League Baseball."409 These games used information concerning
500-700 baseball players from the major leagues.4 1o The action
was formally brought by an association which represented the
collective interests of over 850 players, and was responsible for
negotiating, licensing and marketing contracts as well as group
endorsements. 411 At the time of the action over 27 licensing
agreements were in force, four or five of which were with distributors of products similar to those manufactured by the defendant.412 These agreements produced revenue for the players; the
evidence established that in the previous year alone the total income realized from such ventures exceeded $400,000.4 13
After informing Henricksen that his products constituted an
appropriation of a property right, the association offered to
enter into a standard licensing contract.H4 The action arose out
of the defendant's unwillingness to either withdraw the games
from the consumer market or to be party to a recognized agree404.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.

Berkman, supra note 250, at 537.
Palmer, 232 A.2d at 462.
[d. at 461.
316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970).
[d. at 1278.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 1278-79.
[d. at 1279.
[d.
[d.
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ment.4111 The defendant claimed that, as public figures, the
plaintiffs were not entitled to invoke the right of privacy, and
that by charging a licensing fee of $2,500 the plaintiff was attempting "to keep little people out of the business."H6 Henricksen's effort to escape liability on the basis that the privacy tort
was unavailable to professional sportsmen failed. m This defense
was ineffective because the ground upon which relief was sought
by the plaintiff was "misappropriation and use for commercial
profit of the names of professional major league baseball players
without the payment of royalties."418 The court distinguished
rights involving privacy from those relating to a proprietary interest. H9 The contention that a celebrity is precluded from objecting to the use of his name had merit only in an action for the
invasion of privacy which, as Judge Neville stated, was separate
from the right in contention. 420 The time and effort invested by
baseball players in achieving fame was to be rewarded by the
income generated from agreements such as those negotiated by
the association. m
The Uhlaender ruling safeguards the principle that name
and likeness rights constitute a viable property interest.422 The
Palmer and Uhlaender holdings have been summarized as follows: "In addition to the just result rendered in Uhlaender, its
value lies in the fact that the court, in contrast to the Palmer
court, analyzed the right in question and acknowledged the essential differences between the right of privacy and the right to
publicity. "423
The case which conclusively established the right of publicity as a property right was Zacchini v. Scripps - Howard Broadcasting CO.424 Appearing in virtually every American tort textbook to illustrate the limitations of the first amendment right of
free speech, the case is helpful in the context of publicity rights.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.

[d.

[d.
[d. at 1288-89.
[d. at 1279.
[d. at 1280.
[d. at 1283.
[d. at 1282.
[d. at 1283.
423. Berkman, supra note 250, at 539.
424. 47 Ohio St. 2d 224, 351 N.E.2d 454 (Ohio 1976).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1988

53

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1988], Art. 3

354

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18:301

The facts involve Zacchini who, in spite of his express refusal,
had the tape of his entire 15-second performance as a "human
cannonball" broadcast by the defendant's television station.'211
The plaintiff argued before the Ohio State Supreme Court that
his right to publicity had been infringed by the television station.'26 In response, the defendant invoked its first amendment
rights to report on "newsworthy events."m After a ruling in
favor of the defendant, the case was appealed to the United
States Supreme Court.'28 The lower court's holding was reversed, the Supreme Court finding that the plaintiff's performance was compensable as a property right thereby rendering ineffective the constitutional defense.'29 The Court reasoned that
Zacchini had developed an unusual act which the defendant's
broadcast had minimized the likelihood that the public would
pay to see, the performance of which had been provided for free
to those viewing at home. 4so
The Supreme Court concluded that a valuable property interest was affected because "the telecast had gone beyond the
bounds of First Amendment protection by appropriating
Zacchini's 'entire act.' "4S1 Publicity, as a means from which income is derived, is viewed at the highest level of the federal judiciary as an important right of property.'S2 The courts will protect individuals such as Zacchini from appropriations which seek
to remove the monetary gain derived from commercial endeavors in the public sphere.'ss
The American cases unequivocally established that a right
to publicity was entitled to protection either independently of or
in coexistence with the right to privacy.4s4 The application of
these rights to celebrities by the American courts developed logically from the early cases, and such courts now regard the com425. Zacchini, 351 N.E.2d 454.
426. [d. at 460.
427. [d. at 460-61.
428. 433 U.S. 562 (1979).
429. [d. at 576.
430. [d.
431. Felcher & Rubin, Privacy, Publicity and the Portrayal of Real People by the
Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577, 1590-91 (1979) (citing Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 579 & n.l (Powell,
J., dissenting)).
432. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 570.
433. [d.
434. Rader, supra note I, at 243.
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mercial exploitation of name and likeness to be an important
attribute of a public figure's career.'36 The benefit to celebrities
which may arise from merchandising, licensing contracts and endorsements can potentially yield an income far greater and
longer lasting than the primary field in which notoriety and public recognition was achieved.'36 Legal protection of such income
will enable film stars, recording artists, athletes, and local public
performers to enjoy the "fruit of their labor."'37
Once the courts had characterized publicity as a property
right, they were, as the cases to follow illustrate, faced with a
deluge of litigation regarding standing to bring a claim for misappropriation.'38 Certainly the celebrity is entitled to ask for judicial recognition of the right to publicity. '39 But the issue of
whether the heirs of a public figure could claim protection on
their own behalf still required adjudication. 440 The inheritability
of name and likeness rights was also unsettled."1 The attempt of
the courts to cope with the issue of divisibility has been summarized as follows:
When first presented with this theory, courts
found it sufficiently disconcerting to reject it outright. However, after two decades of agreement
that the right of publicity is a property right, the
idea became more palatable, and several courts
held that the right could be inherited . . . other
cases have proposed different rationales and came
to different conclusions about the circumstances
under which inheritance may occur.H2

Price u. Hal Roach Studios Inc. 443 established that a right of
publicity did not terminate upon the death of the celebrity
whose likeness was the subject of revenue.'44 The parties to this
action were the respective widows of Oliver Hardy and Stanley
Laurel, who were the designated beneficiaries of the estates be435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.

Denicola. supra note 277. at 62-63.
Hefter & Besha. supra note 290, at 593.
Nimmer, supra note 237, at 216.
Felcher & Rubin, supra note 431, at 1593.
[d. at 1589.
[d. at 1593.
[d.
[d. at 1595.
400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
[d. at 844.
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longing to the two famous comic actors. 4411
As plaintiffs, the widows brought a claim against Roach Studios, for their use of the names and likenesses of Laurel and
Hardy.446 The defendant, which had entered into several service
contracts with the actors for the years 1923 through 1939,
claimed that any rights to which the actors had been entitled
had been waived, or, in the alternative, that such rights were in
the public domain.'" Since the plaintiffs did not contest Roach's
right to market the films and still photographs taken while the
actors were under contract with the studio, the court focused
only on the request that the defendant be restrained from merchandising the names or likenesses of Laurel and Hardy after
the expiration of the contract term.448 Counsel for the defendant
attempted to establish that a clause which granted "to Roach
the exclusive rights to photograph, copyright, and reproduce all
the 'acts, poses, plays and appearances' of Laurel and Hardy for
the contract term and 'perpetually' "449 was the equivalent of a
non-revocable license.'lIo The court, however, construed the
clause to relate only to the films and photographs taken while
the actors were employees of the studio, and not to mean that
Roach was entitled to exploit their personalities in any other
context ..m
Both the actors had continued to pursue their careers after
the expiration of their studio contracts, which indicated that a
perpetual right accorded to Roach "was neither contemplated by
the parties nor specifically provided for in the contracts."'112 This
conclusion was further supported by the fact that Stanley Laurel
had specifically insisted that he be free to appear on the radio
for the purpose of endorsing various products. 4113 The court
placed great emphasis on the fact that, after both actors had left
the employment of Roach Studios, their subsequent work was
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.

[d. at 838.
[d. at 839.
[d.

[d. at 840.
[d.
[d. at 540-42.
[d. at 841.
[d.
[d.
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left undisturbed. 4114
After finding that the contract produced at trial by the defendant was insufficient to support a claim that Roach owned
the exclusive rights claimed by the plaintiffs, the court then considered the issue of waiver.4li1i The defendant theorized that, due
to the actors' failure to use their names and likenesses for the
years 1940 to 1954, their right to publicity was abandoned. 41i6
Judge Stewart described this argument as "nonsensical,"41i7 and
cited the New York privacy statute which provides that a celebrity may elect to leave unused his public profile. 41i6
Judge Stewart's opinion provides an important supplement
to the statutory law on the issue of devisability, for he concluded
that "[t]here cannot, therefore, be any necessity to exercise the
right of publicity during one's life in order to protect it from use
by others or to preserve any potential right of one's heirs".41i9
His holding illustrates the flaw in the arguments presented by
the defendant, for by claiming that the right to publicity exists
only for the duration of a celebrity's life, counsel mistook publicity for privacy.460
The right of privacy has been defined as a personal right to
protect against harm to individual feelings. 461 It follows that this
right will perish with the individual who may have found the
necessity to invoke its protection. 462 For this reason, the right of
privacy cannot be assigned or inherited as it is essentially a personal right protecting individual integrity.463 In reference to the
right of publicity, the Price court concluded: "There appears to
be no logical reason to terminate this right upon death of the
person protected. It is for this reason, presumably, that this
publicity right has been deemed a 'property right.' "464 It is im454.
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.
460.
461.
462.
463.
464.

[d.
[d. at 846.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
Berkman, supra note 250, at 527.
Felcher & Rubin, supra note 431, at 1593.
[d.
Price, 400 F. Supp. at 844.
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portant to note that, while the court maintained the plaintiffs'
right to control the names and likenesses of "Stan and OIly,"
such rights were enforceable by designated heirs as distinguished from "mere descendants.""66
In Lugosi v. Universal Pictures,'66 the plaintiff was ultimately not as successful as the widows of Laurel and Hardy."67
The defendant, Universal Studios, was the original producer of
the film "Dracula," which starred the actor Bela Lugosi."68 A
claim was brought against Universal for invasion of the right to
publicity following the execution of licensing agreements between the studio and producers of merchandised items which
depicted Lugosi in his role as Dracula. "69 The trial court, in accordance with Haelan and Uhlaender, found that the right to
publicity had in fact been appropriated."70 The court also determined that Lugosi's right to publicity could be inherited by the
beneficiaries to his will. m
This happy ending was not the final ending, for Universal
appealed the case to the Court of Appeal of California,"72 which
determined that there was no policy basis to support the survival of a right of publicity surviving the death of the individual
concerned. 473 Thus, Lugosi's heirs were not entitled to the exclusive right to market Lugosi as Dracula. 474
The court noted that Lugosi himself had failed to exploit
the marketing potential of his name and likeness during his lifetime. 476 Lugosi's nonuse for the entire duration of his career resulted in a forfeiture of the right to publicity.476 Had any aspect
of the Dracula personality been used for commercial purposes
during the actor's life, the court might have provided a ruling
465. [d. at 844 n.8.
466. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 139 Cal. Rptr. 35 (1977).
467. [d. at 40.
468. [d. at 36.
469. [d.
470. [d. at 37.
471. [d.
472. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 139 Cal. Rptr. 35 (1977), aff'd, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603
P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979).
473. [d. at 40.
474. [d.
475. [d. at 37.
476. [d. at 38.
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similar to the decision in Price.
The question of whether a celebrity must market the right
to publicity during his lifetime was again raised in Groucho
Marx Productions v. Day and Night CO.· 77 This action involved
the assignees of the Marx Brothers rights to publicity.·78 The
defendant, Day and Night, produced a play entitled "A Day In
Hollywood/A Night In the Ukraine,"·79 which allegedly infringed
upon the characterization of the Marx Brothers.· 8o Although the
names Groucho, Chico and Harpo were never mentioned, the
script involved a depiction of Anton Chekov's novel, The Bear,
as performed by three actors utilizing the style of acting made
famous by the Marx Brothers.481 The plaintiff claimed damages
"in the nature of a license fee."·82
The United States District Court of New York granted a
partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff.'83 Judge
Connor found that the appropriate substantive law to govern the
action was that of New York which, unlike California, recognized an inheritable right to publicity.484 Also, since under New
York law a celebrity was required to exploit his name and likeness rights during his lifetime, Connor found that a commercial
use was inherent in the actors' performance itself.'8Ci Thus every
performance, act, or public appearance by the Marx Brothers
"was sufficient exploitation without the need for them to 'endorse dance studios, candy bars or tee shirts.' "486
Like the ruling in Lugosi, this judgment in favor of the assignees was also short-lived.'87 On appeal, Judge Newman determined that the appropriate choice of law was that of California.'88 In accordance with the rules of that state, he found that
the right to publicity and the right of privacy terminated upon a
477.
478.
479.
480.
481.
482.
483.
484.
485.
486.
487.
488.

Groucho Marx Prod. v. Day and Night Co., 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982).
[d. at 318.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 319.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 322.
[d.
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celebrity's death. 4s9 The New York judgment was vacated. 490
Judge Connor's contention that mere performance by the celebrity was a sufficient ground on which his heirs could recover was
therefore overruled. 491 The appellate court had construed more
narrowly the criteria for determining whether exploitation of
name and likeness had occurred. 492 In stating the rationale behind judgment for the defendant, the court mentioned that the
original play produced by Day and Night was distinct from the
products endorsed by the Marx Brothers. 493 Thus, while the
original three actors had advertised items "ranging from Plymouth Automobiles to Smirnoff Vodka,"494 the defendant, by using the likenesses of the Marx Brothers for an unrelated project,
was free from liability.496
In order for the plaintiff's claim to succeed, the court required evidence proving that the use complained of was similar
to a prior exploitation. 496 Judge Newman's holding could be interpreted as leaving the plaintiff without a remedy unless the
defendant sued exploited an area the Marx Brothers had promoted, such as Plymouth or Smirnoff.
Judge Newman was not the first to hold that the right to
publicity must be subordinated to the public interest, which allows for the production of fictional accounts based upon a particular celebrity's life or work. In Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg
Productions,m a claim was brought to enjoin a television production concerning the life of Rudolpho Guglielmi, better known
by his stage name Rudolph Valentino.
The plaintiff, Valentino's nephew and legal heir, objected to
a network program entitled "Legend of Valentino: A Romantic
Fiction.',m The use of Valentino's name and likeness without
prior consent was construed by the plaintiff to be a violation of
489. [d. at 323.
490. [d.

491. [d. at 322.
[d.
[d. at 323.
[d.
[d.

492.
493.
494.
495.
496.

[d.

497. 25 Cal. 3d 860, 603 P.2d 454, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1979).
498. [d. at 862, 603 P.2d at 455, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 353.
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the right to publicity, which the nephew, as heir to the estate,
sought to protect. 499 Chief Justice Bird, on hearing the complaint, seized upon the "context and nature of the use,"IIOO citing
these as the factors which would control the disposition of the
case. IIOl The defendant admitted that Valentino was the central
character in the program, but maintained that the use was related to the actor's own medium and did not promote products
which were distinct from the actor as an individual. ll02 The
plaintiff claimed that the fictional nature of the work was a serious threat to future publicity rights. llos Chief Justice Bird dismissed this argument, reasoning that the defendant's production
was just as likely to inspire curiosity, which would in turn create
a market for authorized biographies, as it was to adversely affect
future plans for merchandising. llo" The court felt that fictional
dramatization was incapable of endangering later factual accounts involving the legendary Valentino. lloll
The resolution of the case depended on which interest was
to be given the greater protection: the creative thought invested
by the defendant or the property interest claimed by the plaintiff.ll06 In rendering judgment for the defendant, Chief Justice
Bird argued that free speech was not to be compromised by an
aggrieved individual's proprietary claim. 1l07 "No author should
be forced into creating mythological words or characters wholly
divorced from reality. The right of publicity derived from public
prominence does not confer a shield to ward off caricature, parody and satire. Rather, prominence invites creative
comments. "1108
Chief Justice Bird was not merely protecting the right of an
author to draw upon people and events which may be used as a
source of material and inspiration. Her statements outline the
important distinction between the creative use of a celebrity for
499.
500.
501.
502.
503.
504.
505.
506.
507.
508.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

at 864, 603 P.2d at 457, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 355.

at 870, 603 P.2d at 460, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
at 870, 603 P.2d at 461, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 359.

at 869, 603 P.2d at 460, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
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the purpose of disseminating ideas and the less valued appropriation which is expressed in the merchandising of unrelated
products. llo9
This judgment leaves undisturbed cases which involve appropriations commited for the purpose of ancillary exploitation
in markets unrelated to the celebrity, or where .the information
presented is of limited social utility. It was this distinction
which precluded Valentino's nephew from claiming the royalties
generated by the defendant's production. lllo
The court in Estate of Presley v. Russen lill was faced with
similar competing interests when the heirs of Elvis Presley
sought to enjoin the defendant from producing a live show which
imitated the late star.1il2 The theatrical performance in question
was called "The Big EI Show" (a tribute to Elvis Presley),lIl3 in
which a Mr. Larry Seth appeared in the traditional "Elvis" costume, which incorporated a jumpsuit, jewelry and scarves which
were handed out to the audience. IIH Songs performed by Seth
were those made famous by Presley, and Presley's poses and
choreography were imitated.1ilIi Performances were given
throughout the United States and Canada without authority in
the form of a contract or license from the estate. lll6 As successors, Presley's heirs claimed that their right to publicity was infringed by the Big EI Show.1i17 Judge Brotman applied the same
test as that used by Chief Justice Bird to determine whether the
performance served any social utility by providing "a substantial
value to society."1I18 The production, in spite of its popularity,
involved imitation as opposed to creative or biographical interpretation.1il9 Audiences watching the performance were at best
informed about a singer who shaped the development of the music and entertainment industry.1I2o Imitation was, in the estima509. [d. at 874, 603 P.2d at 463, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 361.
510. [d. at 875, 603 P.2d at 464, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 362.

511. 513 1<'. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981).
512. [d. at 1344.
513. [d. at 1349.
514. [d. at 1348.
515. [d.
516. [d. at 1349.
517. [d. at 1354.
518. [d. at 1359.
519. [d.
520. [d. at 1360.
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tion of the court, lacking in creativity and without social
merit. m For this reason, judgment was granted for the plaintiff,
since the primary function of the defendant's production was to
"appropriate the commercial value of the likeness of Elvis
Presley. "522
The court also asked whether the right to publicity could be
subject to inheritance.1I23 The judgment of the New Jersey court
found that the heirs to the Presley estate were, by inheritance,
entitled to enjoy the benefits achieved by Presley.524 The right to
publicity itself had, in previous decisions, been recognized and
was, in the court's view, capable of being the subject of a lease or
assignment. 1I2II Since the plaintiffs were designated beneficiaries
under Presley's will, they had standing to challenge the defendant's appropriation. 526 Unfortunately, the action requested an
interim, as opposed to a final, injunction regarding the defendant's production. 527 In this action, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate injury and neglected to request a permanent injunction
which could have resulted in a holding in their favor. 1I28 The case
is nevertheless important since it established that publicity
rights may become the property of a designated beneficiary
under a valid will.1I29
The litigation brought by those seeking financial advantage
from the royalties accruing to the Presley estate was considerable.lISo In Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc.,m the holder of an
exclusive license to exploit commercially the name and likeness
of Elvis Presley requested an injunction and damages against
defendant Pro Arts.1IS2 Factors had obtained its license two days
after Presley's death for the sum of $100,000, and began preparing merchandised items almost immediately.1IS3 Also seeking to
521.
522.
523.
524.
525.
526.
527.
528.
529.
530.
531.
532.
533.

[d. at 1359.
[d. at 1360.
[d. at 1354.
[d. at 1361.
[d. at 1335.
[d. at 1361.
[d. at 1344.
[d. at 1379.
[d. at 1361.
[d. at 1339; Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978).
Factors, 579 F.2d at 215.
[d. at 216.
[d. at 217.
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benefit from the income that Elvis memorabilia could render,
Pro Arts purchased the copyright to a photograph of Presley
taken by a journalist. 1I34 Three days after Presley's death, the
defendant produced for sale a poster size blowup of the photo.
graph which read "In Memory - 1935-1977."11311
On learning of the defendant's activities, Factors requested
that the item be removed from the market. 1I36 In support of its
refusal to comply with the plaintiff's demand, Pro Arts claimed
that the right of publicity was extinguished at Presley's death,
or alternatively, that the poster was merely a reminder of an
event which could be classified as newsworthy.1I37 The court rejected the second contention, ruling that the product, being
neither creative nor newsworthy, was not entitled to protection
under the first amendment. 1I3s
In ruling on the case, Judge Ingraham held that the right to
publicity, unlike the right of privacy, was capable of surviving
the death of a celebrity.1i39 Factors, as a bona fide licensee, was
properly asserting its own contractual right to claim the royalties and entitlement to exploit the name and likeness of Elvis
Presley.1I40 This conclusion embraced the theory of unjust enrichment, for a contrary ruling would have provided a gain to
those engaged in the unconsented to exploitation of a deceased
public figure. 1I41 Judge Ingraham added: "[A]t the same time, the
exclusive right purchased by Factors and the financial benefits
accruing to the celebrity's heirs would be rendered virtually
worthless."1142 This interpretation of the aim toward which the
law should strive in defining the relationship and concurrent
rights of parties such as those in the instant case was not upheld
on appeal.li43 Although the issue of whether a celebrity must
himself exploit publicity rights was, due to Presley's own com534. Id.
535. Id.
536. Id.
537. Id. at 219.
538. Id. at 222.
539. Id. at 221.
540. Id.
541. Id.
542.Id.
543. 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), aff'g 444 F. Supp. 288 (S.D. N.Y. 1977), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
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mercial ventures, not resolved, this requirement further narrowed the publicity doctrine.I!"
If the heirs of a public figure are to be successful in claiming
for their own benefit, publicity rights, there must be evidence
"that the celebrity 'acted in such a way as to evidence his or her
own recognition of the extrinsic commercial value of his or her
name or likeness', and manifested that recognition in some overt
manner, e.g. making an inter vivos transfer in the rights of the
name."1!41!

Judge Ingraham's view would provide celebrities with the
ability to designate, after death, those individuals to whom financial benefits are to flow. This would accord with the premise
upon which private property and the entire area comprising the
law of wills and trusts had been established. The right to publicity, having achieved status as a property right, must be subject
to alienation by the celebrity who created the interest. Although
this provides a benefit to designated beneficiaries at the expense
of more commercially enterprising individuals, the law of inheritance sanctions unconditional donations. Just as private individuals are free to decide matters affecting the distribution of their
property, those who work in professions which invite public notoriety should be accorded the same opportunity and freedom of
decision.
V. ADVERTISING PRACTICE
Turning from judicial sources of relief for the instances of
appropriation, the advertising industry in Britain developed
standards to guide those wishing to use the name and likeness of
a celebrity for promotional purposes. These rules are codified in
The British Code of Advertising Practice 646 [hereafter "British
Code"] and The IBA Code of Advertising Standards and Practice 647 [hereafter "IBA Code"]. The British Code is concerned
with non-broadcast advertisements, and applies to promotions
544. Factors, 579 F.2d at 216.
545. Rader, supra note 1, at 235.
546. THE BRITISH CODE OF ADVERTISING PRACTICE (Cap committee 7th ed. Oct. 1985)
[hereinafter "BRITISH CODE").
547. THE INDEPENDENT BROADCASTING AUTHORITY CODE OF ADVERTISING STANDARDS
AND PRACTICE, (lBA July 1986) [hereinafter "IBA CODE"].
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appearing in "newspapers, magazines, printed publications, posters, cinema and video-cassette commercials, viewdata services,
as well as leaflets and brochures wherever they appear."M8 In an
attempt to go beyond the standard that previously required advertisements to be "legal, decent, honest and truthful,"1i49 the
British Code places particular emphasis on the extent to which
an individual may be exploited in an advertisement.li lio Section
17.1 states that "advertisements should not portray or refer to
any living persons, in whatever form or by whatever means, unless their express prior permission has been obtained."lilil This
protection, although apparently comprehensive, is diminished by
an exception which allows exploitation if the product is not "inconsistent with the celebrity's position,"1i1i2 and does not interfere with the individual's "right to enjoy a reasonable degree of
privacy."lilis Ostensibly, this provides recognition of a right of
privacy by requiring that this right be free from commercial invasion.1iIi4 But a celebrity whose name and likeness was used in a
marketing strategy consistent with his public character may be
without a remedy.1i1i1i This is best illustrated by advertisements
which utilize a double entendre for promotion. For example, an
alcohol distributor published a headline which read "vodka
without Russchian is like Lenin without McCartney."1i1i6 It is
reasonable to assume from the appearance of the advertisement
that some members of the public would construe this as an
endorsement.
Although David Frost was able to stop the owners of a new
hotel from using his photograph in conjunction with a caption
which read "no matter who you are we can make you feel at
home,,,m it was only due to the threat of a libel action that the
proprietors agreed to withdraw the advertisement.1iIi8 Even this
type of claim will not always be effective in preventing un au tho548.
549.
550.
551.
552.
553.
554.
555.
556.
557.
558.

BRITISH CODE, supra note 546, at 19.
[d. at 8.
[d. at 31.
[d. at 31, §17.1.
[d. at 31, §17.2.
[d.
[d. at 31.
Frazer, supra note 2, at 282 n.6.
[d. at 282.
R. WACKS, THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY 167 (1980).
[d.
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rized use, for the plaintiff must prove that the advertisement
contains a defamatory implication in order to sustain a libel action. ll1i9 Thus, a public figure's name, when isolated from the context of an overt or defamatory endorsement, may still be exploited by advertisers.1I6o
Additionally, the requirement that "living" persons must
first give their express consent would make available to advertisers the names and likenesses of celebrities now deceased. 1I61 The
British Code does not state whether permission from heirs is required for exploitation of a public figure,1I62 and as such is not
useful in an attempt to prohibit appropriation of public figures
no longer alive. 1I6a
The IBA Code is concerned exclusively with advertisements
broad casted on television and radio.II6' This code aspires to a
higher quality of advertising because it is thought that those listening to radio or television programs in the home or car are a
captive audience. 1I611 Provision 13 of the IBA Code contains the
limits within which celebrities and all other individuals may be
exploited for promotional purposes.1I66 This provision reads: "Individual living persons should not normally be portrayed or referred to in an advertisement without their permission."1167 The
IBA Code provisions are basically a set of guiding rules created
for the advertising industry.1I68 But the drafting is too weak to
provide any significant protection, whether an individual is a celebrity or not, since the code is not legally enforceable.1I69 The
use of the word "normally" indicates that there might be exceptions which would justify unauthorized use of name or likeness. 1I70 It is still possible for one who provides an unusual reason which would justify appropriation to abuse a celebrity's
559. [d. at 167-68.
560. [d. at 168.

561.

BRITISH CODE,

supra note 546, at 31, §17.1.

562. [d.
563. [d.

564. IBA CODE, supra note 547, at 3.
[d.
[d. at 4.
[d.
[d. at 3.
[d. at 2.
[d. at 4.

565.
566.
567.
568.
569.
570.
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right to publicity.1I7l Perhaps the most helpful provision in the
IBA Code is the rule which requires all advertisers broadcasting
on television and radio to comply with both statutory and common law.1I72 The IBA Code is enforced through self-regulation
within the advertising industry, but stronger legislation is required to safeguard the individual.
The British and IBA Codes, while providing guidelines and
theoretical principles, are not enforceable and do not fill the gap
created by the British courts' dilatory action in providing judicial remedies for appropriation. There is a great need for reform
in the common law. Legislation should be provided to control
the taking without compensation of a celebrity's right to publicity. In the absence of change, abuses of this property right in the
form of lost income, merchandising opportunities, and personal
dignity will flourish.
VI. CONCLUSION - FUTURE LEGISLATION
The American common law has developed to accommodate
a right of privacy and to ensure that the right to publicity constitutes a viable source of income for celebrities. The ability of
famous individuals to capitalize on the endorsement of products
can provide large sums of revenue. Not only is this avenue for
realizing income important to a public figure, it may also serve
as the only means by which the heirs of a mismanaged celebrity
can benefit.
English law regarding the appropriation of name and likeness rights lags behind the relatively recent strides made in
America. Due to the fact that actions for passing off still require
a common field of activity between the plaintiff and defendant,
this tort is of limited value to a celebrity whose name or likeness
has been the subject of appropriation. Additionally, English
courts are reluctant to interfere with free competition, which
frequently results in the judicial giveaway of merchandising opportunities to those engaged in the exploitation of a public figure's personality. But neither country has successfully developed
a coherent system which can afford adequate protection. The
571. [d.
572. [d. at 3, provo 2.
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characterization of publicity as a property right rather than a
transient personal interest is important. More vital still is the
need to provide a means by which this property, like any other,
may descend to chosen beneficiaries. In the world of constantly
advancing technology and swifter modes of communication,
those who wish to appropriate names and likenesses are furnished with a variety of methods to do so. It is from the courts
that celebrities should be able to obtain redress. The law should
provide safeguards which will enable individuals to benefit from
their own labor. Future legislation may provide protection for
celebrities by implementing the proposals contained in the following model.
(1) Legislative recognition of a statutory right of
publicity, i.e. the right vested in each [celebrity:
one with "fame, renown, wide recognition"]G73 of
the sole right to 'exploit' commercially his own
name and likeness, or to refrain therefrom.
(2) No person shall take for commercial purposes
the name or likeness of a celebrity without first
having obtained a license, from that celebrity or
his agent.
(3) "Commercial purposes" shall include, but not
be limited to, (a) endorsements; (b) merchandized
items; (c) creative or fictional works not containing a newsworthy character; (d) any product offered for sale to the public, utilizing name or
likeness.
(4) A celebrity will be entitled to exercise his
right to publicity at any time and will not be precluded from entering into agreements with a
party contracting to exploit the same.
(5) In the event that the celebrity is no longer living, the legatees of his estate will be vested with
the right to negotiate publicity rights and licenses
on their own behalf.
(6) The fee for licensing agreements will be calculated with reference to the nature and extent of
the use made.
(7) In the event that name or likeness rights are
exploited in the absence of license, the party owning the right to publicity will be entitled to enforce a license effective immediately upon the dis573. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 235. (World Publishing Co. 1966).
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covery of the use, and damages will be added to
the fee designated.
(8) Publicity rights will be the property of a celebrity or his heirs for a term not exceeding the
life of the celebrity plus fifty years, and, upon expiration, his name and reputation will be within
the public domain.
(9) A private organization will be established to
provide enforcement and redress to those owning
the right of publicity, and will include affiliated
bodies to provide reciprocal protection on an international basis.

The establishment of a private organization to provide a
system of registration and licensing for publicity rights is advisable. Appropriations which occur on an international basis must
be traced by a body similar in structure and function to a Performing Rights Society. II,. But the scope of any such future organization must be enlarged to include affiliates in countries
where publicity rights are employed for advertising purposes.
The use of name and likeness would be monitored within each
specified geographical area, and enforced by contractual agreement. Associated bodies are therefore necessary to provide protection since the law has not kept pace with rapidly developing
media technology, which in its most advanced form is represented by satellite broadcasting throughout the world. In the absence of clear legislative and judicial rules, and in the presence
of the ineffective self-regulating measures taken by the advertising industry, a society charged with the aim of enforcing protection of name and likeness rights may be the only effective means
by which protection against appropriation can occur.

574. The Performing Rights Society, an organization composed of writers and publishers of music, the function of which is to enforce copyright throughout many European countries.
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